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ARTICLE
POLICE SUSPECTS
Kate Levine*
Recent attention to police brutality has brought to the fore how law
enforcement, when they become the subject of criminal investigations,
receive special procedural protections not available to any other criminal
suspect. Prosecutors’ special treatment of police suspects, particularly
their perceived use of grand juries to exculpate accused officers, has
received the lion’s share of scholarly and media attention. But police
suspects also beneﬁt from formal affirmative rights that protect them
from interrogation by other officers. Police, in most jurisdictions, have a
special shield against interrogation known as the Law Enforcement
Officers’ Bill of Rights (LEOBOR). These statutes and negotiated
agreements protect police from tactics that are part and parcel of the
confession-inducing playbook these same officers use when questioning
civilian suspects.
This Article investigates these formal procedural protections for
police suspects. It argues that, as criminal justice insiders, police have
dealt themselves special protections from police questioning based on
their knowledge of what protections a suspect needs most when facing
interrogation. Meanwhile, the police continue to argue that failing to
use these selfsame tactics on other suspects will hamper their ability to
catch and convict dangerous criminals.
The distributive inequality created by special police rights threatens
the fairness and legitimacy of the criminal justice system in several
ways: It skews the relationship between suspect sophistication and the
amount of protection received, it sullies the appearance of justice, and it
decreases the normative value of criminal law.
The nascent awareness of these special interrogation protections
has led a number of scholars and commentators to call for revoking
police officers’ LEOBOR rights in order to achieve accountability and
distributive equality. Yet the opposite response may be theoretically and
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practically superior. As criminal justice insiders, the preferences police
negotiate for and receive can serve as a model for ways to reform a
particularly problematic part of our criminal justice system. Thus,
before we strip protections from the police, we should look hard at how
these protections might apply to all criminal suspects.
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INTRODUCTION
Over the past couple of years, the visibility of police brutality and
criminality has attracted heightened attention from scholars, the media,
and the American public.1 Although police crimes are far from a new
phenomenon, our focus has never been more attuned to how often those
1. See, e.g., Sandhya Somashekhar & Steven Rich, Final Tally: Police Shot and Killed
986 People in 2015, Wash. Post (Jan. 6, 2016), http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/
ﬁnal-tally-police-shot-and-killed-984-people-in-2015/2016/01/05/3ec7a404-b3c5-11e5-a7
6a-0b5145e8679a_story.html [http://perma.cc/GCQ4-XNSF] (summarizing Washington
Post’s year-long study of on-duty police killings by ﬁrearm).
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entrusted with our security are violating it.2 Along with this increasing
awareness of police criminality, there has been a round criticism of the
way police suspects are investigated (or not), charged (or not), convicted
(or not), and punished (or not).3 Critics charge that police often appear
to be above the laws they are tasked with upholding.4 As a result,
commentators and scholars have begun to call for eliminating the
advantages police suspects enjoy; they want more criminal accountability
for police.5
2. Several movements, including “Black Lives Matter,” have gained followers and
clout in direct response to the Michael Brown shooting and its aftermath. See Jay Caspian
Kang, ‘Our Demand is Simple: Stop Killing Us’, N.Y. Times Mag. (May 4, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/10/magazine/our-demand-is-simple-stop-killing-us.
html (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) (describing rise of Black Lives Matter as
nation’s ﬁrst civil rights movement in twenty-ﬁrst century). President Barack Obama is one
of many politicians who have commented on the crisis of police brutality. See, e.g., Ben
Mathis-Lilley, Obama Calls Police Violence a “Crisis,” Condemns Mass Neglect of Poor,
Slate: The Slatest (Apr. 28, 2015, 3:03 PM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/the_slatest/
2015/04/28/obama_baltimore_press_conference_president_s_comments_on_police_and
_poor.html [http://perma.cc/5UP7-EFVM] (covering President Obama’s statement that
persistence of police violence in United States is “troubling”).
3. See, e.g., Kate Levine, Who Shouldn’t Prosecute the Police, 101 Iowa L. Rev.
(forthcoming May 2016) [hereinafter Levine, Who Shouldn’t Prosecute] (manuscript at
2) (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) (examining conﬂict of interest between local
prosecutors and law enforcement); Shaun King, How the Brelo Verdict in Cleveland
Proves Laws Protecting People from Police Are Broken, Daily Kos (May 26, 2015, 11:55
AM), http://www.dailykos.com/story/2015/05/26/1387822/-How-the-Brelo-verdict-in-Cleve
land-proves-laws-protecting-people-from-police-are-broken [http://perma.cc/UXA4-CHTD]
(noting Officer Michael Brelo was acquitted after bench trial for ﬁring dozens of shots
into car window and killing two people); Walter Olson, Police Misconduct and ‘Law
Enforcement Officers’ Bill of Rights’ Laws, Cato Inst.: Cato at Liberty (Apr. 24, 2015, 1:34
PM), http://www.cato.org/blog/police-misconduct-law-enforcement-officers-bill-rights [http://
perma.cc/SUU5-4P43] (arguing these laws shield police from investigation); Danny Vinik,
Here’s Why Ferguson Protesters Don’t Accept the Michael Brown Decision, New Republic
(Nov. 25, 2014), http://www.newrepublic.com/Article/120402/ferguson-protests-overmichael-brown-case-about-racist-justice-system [http://perma.cc/JX8N-QLFW] (discussing
failure to indict Officer Darren Wilson).
4. Recently, due in part to increased societal attention and the advent of cellphone
videos, a number of officers have been charged with assault and homicide crimes. These
include, among others, Officer Michael Slager, who shot Walter Scott, an unarmed man,
in the back; several officers involved with the fatal fracturing of Freddie Gray’s spine; and
Officer Peter Liang, who shot Akai Gurley in a Brooklyn stairwell. See Brandon Ellington
Patterson, Here Are All of the Cops Who Were Charged in 2015 for Shooting Suspects,
Mother Jones (Dec. 17, 2015, 6:00 AM), http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2015/
12/year-police-shootings [http://perma.cc/HU5U-49AY] (describing criminal charges
ﬁled against law enforcement officers for shooting suspects in 2015).
5. See infra Parts II–III (discussing police protections and attendant risks); see also
Brian Buetler, The NYC Cop Who Strangled Eric Garner to Death Is Free Thanks to a
Legal Flaw. Here’s How Voters Can Fix It, New Republic (Dec. 3, 2014), http://
www.newrepublic.com/Article/120478/eric-garner-police-officer-shouldve-been-investiga
ted-independently [http://perma.cc/Q7QY-WB4Q] (quoting Professor Ronald Wright
about ability to appoint special prosecutors in police brutality cases); Eli Hager, Blue
Shield, Marshall Project (Apr. 27, 2015, 12:06 PM), http://www.themarshallproject.
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Most of the attention to preferential treatment has focused on
prosecutors’ decisions not to bring criminal charges against police for
acts of brutality or on prosecutors’ use of grand juries to exculpate
police.6 Yet this prosecutorial favoritism is just one of a number of special
procedural protections police suspects receive. In fact, a potentially more
problematic set of procedural advantages emerges from special interrogatory shields that many local governments and some state legislatures
have erected known as Law Enforcement Officers’ Bills of Rights
(LEOBORs).
LEOBORs take the form of state statutes or negotiated jurisdictional
agreements and provide affirmative interrogation protections for police
suspects that go far beyond the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment
protections that other suspects receive. For instance, LEOBORs often
provide that police suspects may be questioned only during the day; that
they may be questioned only by a limited number of interrogators; that
they must be given time to attend to their personal needs; that they may
not be threatened, subjected to abusive language, or induced to confess
through untrue promises of leniency; and that their choice to inculpate
themselves must not be conditioned on losing their job or beneﬁts.7
LEOBORs represent the formal procedural protections police
demand when they are accused of and questioned about wrongdoing. As
such, they are an important and heretofore overlooked tool for better
understanding and potentially reforming interrogation law.8 In
combination with other procedural advantages police suspects receive,
LEOBORs both tell an ugly story of insider favoritism and present a
possible roadmap for reforming critical aspects of our criminal justice
system.9
Police suspects’ insider status makes LEOBORs both a threat to the
criminal justice system’s legitimacy and at the same time an important
org/2015/04/27/blue-shield [http://perma.cc/QYZ9-SGLA] (quoting several prominent
scholars, most of whom argue for repeal of laws protecting police from investigation).
6. See supra notes 1–4 (describing prosecutorial treatment of recent police brutality
incidents); see also Jeffrey Fagan & Bernard E. Harcourt, Professors Fagan and Harcourt
Provide Facts on Grand Jury in Light of Ferguson Decision, Columbia Law Sch. (Dec. 5,
2014, 12:00 PM), http://www.law.columbia.edu/media_inquiries/news_events/2014/
november2014/Facts-on-Ferguson-Grand-Jury [http://perma.cc/SHR9-3X3A] (comparing evidence presented to Officer Wilson’s grand jury with usual presentations by
prosecutors).
7. See infra section II.B (showing ways LEOBORs and other protections skew
constitutional justice in favor of police defendants).
8. By “formal,” it refers to the constitutional and statutory protections police opt for
in states with LEOBORs. By “informal,” this Article refers to the discretionary decisions
prosecutors make about declining to charge police or presenting full cases to grand juries.
9. See Kate Levine, How We Prosecute the Police, 104 Geo. L.J. 745, 755–56 (2016)
[hereinafter Levine, How We Prosecute] (arguing prosecutors take more care and
conduct more investigation before charging police suspects than any other class of
suspects).
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lens through which to reconsider confession law. This Article aims to
further the nascent awareness of the criminal justice system’s preferential
procedural treatment of police suspects by examining LEOBORs and
contrasting them with the laws that protect other criminal suspects. In
doing so, it adds another dimension to the already rich literature on
policing,10 as well as to the existing literature on bias among criminal
justice insiders.11 It locates police within a small group of criminal justice
insiders who understand and drive our increasingly opaque system.
This Article argues ﬁrst that formal criminal procedure preferences
for police suspects threaten the legitimacy of the criminal justice system
in several ways. Additional interrogatory process for police threatens the
idea that criminal procedures are distributed fairly,12 sullies the
appearance of fairness in the criminal justice system,13 and by doing so,
lessens the system’s ability to encourage cooperation with the law.14 The
criminal justice system’s insider-driven operation,15 as well as bias on the

10. Recent scholarship on policing has examined several related phenomena. Some
of the scholarship has examined noncriminal laws that regulate police. See Seth W.
Stoughton, The Incidental Regulation of Policing, 98 Minn. L. Rev. 2179, 2179–82 (2014)
(exploring policing regulation “modifying the scope of police authority”); Seth W.
Stoughton, Policing Facts, 88 Tul. L. Rev. 847, 848–52 (2014) (identifying mechanisms of
courts that regulate police action). Other authors have focused on how lawsuits regulate
police. See Rachel A. Harmon, The Problem of Policing, 110 Mich. L. Rev. 761, 762–63
(2012) (contending police regulation should extend beyond traditional paradigm of
constitutional criminal procedure); Joanna C. Schwartz, Police Indemniﬁcation, 89 N.Y.U.
L. Rev. 885, 887–90 (2014) (offering empirical analysis of extent of police indemniﬁcation
in misconduct cases). Further, some scholarship considers who should be tasked with
prosecuting the police. See Levine, Who Shouldn’t Prosecute, supra note 3 (manuscript at
1–2) (critiquing reliance on local prosecutors in police misconduct cases). Scholars have
argued for more prosecutions of less-visible police crimes. See I. Bennett Capers, Crime,
Legitimacy, and Testilying, 83 Ind. L.J. 835, 835, 873 (2008). Finally, some scholarship has
urged preemptive reform. See David M. Jaros, Preempting the Police, 55 B.C. L. Rev. 1149,
1149 (2014).
11. See generally Stephanos Bibas, The Machinery of Criminal Justice, at xv–xvii
(2012) [hereinafter Bibas, Machinery] (arguing criminal justice system is known only to
certain insiders who pursue their own preferences); William J. Stuntz, The Collapse of
American Criminal Justice 62 (2011) [hereinafter Stuntz, Collapse] (describing criminal
justice insiders’ advantages).
12. See infra Part III (describing systemic harms arising from favorable treatment of
police suspects).
13. See Levine, Who Shouldn’t Prosecute, supra note 3 (manuscript at 9–14)
(discussing appearance-of-justice standard and effect of police defendants’ prosecutorial
favoritism on standard).
14. Tom R. Tyler, Why People Obey the Law 20, 73–74, 110 (2006) [hereinafter Tyler,
Why People Obey] (noting “procedural justice” matters more to people’s notions of
fairness than substantive outcomes of individual cases and cooperation with law depends
on trust in authorities’ impartiality).
15. See infra Part I (establishing importance of disconnect between criminal justice
insiders and outsiders).
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part of legal authorities, are among the biggest threats to criminal law.16
Thus, self-dealing among criminal justice insiders is among the most
salient illustrations of how legal authorities undermine the system they
enforce.
But what results should ﬂow from this conclusion? This Article’s
second argument is that our response to these procedural inequalities
should be to extend certain of these formal interrogation protections to
all suspects rather than to strip them from the police.17 In doing so, this
Article upends the dominant response from scholars and politicians that
LEOBORs and other procedural preferences for police suspects should
be abolished to ensure equally harsh treatment for all suspects.18 It
argues instead that by examining the systemic favorable treatment of
police, we can map out a fairer, more accurate, and more workable
system of justice for other defendants.19
In fact, this Article examines LEOBORs with an eye to what the
criminal justice system gets right about police suspects that it so often gets
wrong in the context of other suspects.20 Several criticisms of policesuspect leniency dovetail with scholarship calling for more protective
measures for civilian criminal suspects. For example, while many have
critiqued prosecutors’ decisions not to charge police, others have called
for more systematic decisions not to charge in other categories of cases.21
And while some are outraged at the perceived use of grand juries to
exculpate police defendants,22 others have called for strengthening the
16. See infra Part III (arguing formal protections for police suspects, in combination
with other procedural advantages, threaten criminal justice system).
17. See infra section IV.A (arguing some aspects of LEOBORs should be extended to
all suspects).
18. See infra section IV.A (characterizing absolute abolition of LEOBORs as
dominant view among scholars covering subject).
19. Another option is to limit LEOBORs to noncriminal disciplinary matters. This
solution is problematic for a number of reasons. It eschews the promise of reform that
LEOBORs represent. Further, a decision about whether an investigation might lead to
criminal charges would have to be made before questioning an officer; otherwise, every
investigation into misconduct would have to be split into disciplinary and criminal—a
difficult and resource-heavy task for busy police departments.
20. See infra Parts II, IV (discussing greater protections against interrogation
afforded to police suspects from LEOBORs and arguing for extending such protections to
other criminal suspects).
21. See Josh Bowers, Legal Guilt, Normative Innocence, and the Equitable Decision
Not to Prosecute, 110 Colum. L. Rev. 1655, 1661 (2010) (arguing for equitable charging
discretion in petty-crime cases while challenging assumption prosecutors are best
positioned to exclusively exercise such discretion); Levine, How We Prosecute, supra note
9, at 767 (arguing precharge process given to police suspects could be model for one
element of criminal justice reform); Marc L. Miller & Ronald F. Wright, The Black Box, 94
Iowa L. Rev. 125, 131 (2008) (arguing for greater internal regulation of prosecutors’
offices given social norms’ ability to override legal rules).
22. See, e.g., Letter from Sherrilyn A. Iﬁll, Dir. & Counsel, NAACP Legal Def. &
Educ. Fund, to Maura McShane, Judge, 21st Judicial Dist. (Jan. 15, 2015), http://
www.naacpldf.org/ﬁles/case_issue/NAACP%20LDF%20Letter%20to%20Judge%20Maura
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use of grand juries for all defendants.23 Similarly, while some may bristle
at LEOBORs,24 these statutory rights mirror or exceed many of the
procedural protections that scholars have urged for years be extended to
nonpolice defendants.25 Protections that police receive have the potential to aid the most vulnerable suspects and to reduce the alarming
number of false confessions that have recently come to light through
studies of exonerations.26 As the negotiation preferences of those who
interrogate daily, these protections for police should not be reduced or
repealed without careful consideration of how they might apply more
broadly. To do so would be to ignore an important opportunity for criminal justice reform.
%20McShane.pdf [http://perma.cc/M9T4-W2LG] (calling for investigation into State v.
Darren Wilson grand jury proceedings for preferential treatment of defendant and
erroneous instructions on law, among other issues); Tamara Aparton, SF Public Defender’s
Statement on Grand Jury Decision, S.F. Pub. Defender (Nov. 26, 2014), http://
sfpublicdefender.org/news/201411/sf-public-defenders-statement-on-grand-jury-decision
[http://perma.cc/4X2J-99CG] (noting problems with police investigation into Officer
Wilson following shooting of Michael Brown); Sara Hossaini, Public Defenders Hold
“Black Lives Matter” Rallies for Police Accountability, KQED News (Dec. 18, 2014),
http://ww2.kqed.org/news/2014/12/18/public-defenders-hold-black-lives-matter-ralliesfor-police-accountability [http://perma.cc/ET4T-HWEN] (“Public defenders in San
Francisco, Alameda, Contra Costa, Santa Clara and Solano counties protested in support
of national outrage over decisions not to indict police officers involved in the deaths of
unarmed black men.”).
23. See Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., Grand Jury Discretion and Constitutional Design, 93
Cornell L. Rev. 703, 706 (2008) (arguing grand jury discretion contributes to effective
administration of criminal justice system); Ric Simmons, Re-Examining the Grand Jury: Is
There Room for Democracy in the Criminal Justice System?, 82 B.U. L. Rev. 1, 15 (2002)
(noting modern grand juries participate in criminal justice process in more limited
fashion than early grand juries); Suja A. Thomas, Blackstone’s Curse: The Fall of the
Criminal, Civil, and Grand Juries and the Rise of the Executive, the Legislature, the
Judiciary, and the States, 55 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1195, 1197 (2014) (arguing substance of
jury’s power under Constitution has decreased over time); see also Laura I. Appleman,
The Plea Jury, 85 Ind. L.J. 731, 732–33 (2010) (calling for jury review of plea bargains).
24. See Hager, supra note 5 (discussing encumbering nature of LEOBORs); Olson,
supra note 3 (discussing how LEOBOR in Maryland made investigation into Freddie
Gray’s death “frustrating”).
25. Many scholars have noted that the criminal procedure revolution of the 1960s
and 1970s has not only underserved most defendants but might actually work against poor
criminal defendants who cannot access their “rights.” See Michelle Alexander, The New
Jim Crow 103 (2010) (arguing system maintains official “colorblind” rights-based facade by
granting extraordinary discretion to law enforcement and limiting systemic racism claims
brought by minority defendants); Stephen B. Bright, Counsel for the Poor: The Death
Sentence Not for the Worst Crime but for the Worst Lawyer, 103 Yale L.J. 1835, 1878
(1994) (“It is unlikely that the promise of Powell and Gideon will ever be fulﬁlled for most
of those accused of criminal violations.”); William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship
Between Criminal Procedure and Criminal Justice, 107 Yale L.J. 1, 76 (1997) (arguing
Miranda’s solution to coerced confessions harmed suspects it aimed to protect).
26. See infra sections II.A, III.A (discussing speciﬁc protections afforded police
suspects and how not extending some protections to all criminal suspects delegitimizes
criminal justice system).
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This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I establishes why examining
police defendants’ preferential procedural treatment is important. It
draws on current scholarship regarding the disconnect between criminal
justice insiders and outsiders to show that an inquiry into special
procedures given to insiders has much to tell us about the criminal
justice system’s problems and its potential. It argues that examining these
practices furthers our understanding of how the criminal justice system
operates favorably for insiders and creates distrust from outsiders.27
Part II focuses on interrogation protections for most suspects and
contrasts them with the added protections police receive from
LEOBORs. First, it sketches the constitutional doctrine that aims to
protect suspects from interrogation and the problems with these weak,
negative rights—including both the favoritism of sophisticated suspects
and the use of coercive but legal police tactics that may lead to false confessions in a disturbing number of cases. Next, it identiﬁes the speciﬁc
affirmative protections that police officers afford themselves when they
are the subjects of interrogation. These formal interrogation protections
that police negotiate or lobby for in LEOBORs are protections from the
very techniques they use to investigate and induce confessions from
nonpolice defendants.28
Part III argues that special formal protections for police suspects
raise numerous systemic problems, particularly in combination with the
other procedural advantages police appear to enjoy. It identiﬁes at least
three serious harms. First, these distributional advantages undermine a
core goal of constitutional criminal procedure by virtually inverting the
relationship between a suspect’s sophistication and the protection she
receives. Second, giving special rights to police, who are among the most
sophisticated suspects, sullies the appearance of justice, a principle
applied mostly to judges,29 but one that should also be considered when
thinking about the police because of how important these agents are to
the criminal justice system’s legitimacy.30 Finally, it argues that self-dealing
by and special treatment for law enforcement suspects are particularly
salient examples of how criminal justice insiders negatively affect procedural justice and threaten the normative value of the criminal law.31
Part III also addresses the possible objection that police deserve special
27. See Tyler, Why People Obey, supra note 14, at 73 (noting “procedural justice”
matters more to people’s notions of fairness than substantive outcomes of individual
cases).
28. See infra Part II (detailing formal protections for police suspects during police
investigations).
29. See Levine, Who Shouldn’t Prosecute, supra note 3 (manuscript at 13) (arguing
principle should apply to prosecutors).
30. See infra section III.A (characterizing extra police protections as systemic perils
to fairness, legitimacy, and appearance of justice).
31. See infra section III.B (discussing how special protections in criminal justice
system may undercut respect for rule of law).
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procedural protections because of their status as law enforcement
officers.
Finally, Part IV wrestles with the issue of whether the procedural
rights granted to police should be nulliﬁed in order to make the system
harsher toward police but more equally distributed or extended to other
criminal suspects to increase the fairness and accuracy of the system
more generally. 32 Returning to the theme of criminal justice insiders, it
argues that examining what procedures police suspects negotiate for in
anticipation of becoming potential suspects is an invaluable lens through
which to view the criminal justice system. LEOBORs possess features that
are uncommon to most criminal lawmaking: They are drafted by insiders
who know how the system operates and by insiders who, perhaps more
signiﬁcantly, imagined themselves as criminal suspects.33 This Article
selects among the provisions those that should be extended based on two
independent (but often interrelated) principles.34 First, certain rights
should be extended because they also represent protections against
tactics that studies show tend to coerce vulnerable suspects and that
exoneration literature tells us lead to false confessions. Second, certain
other rights may have little to do with whether or not one falsely
confesses but are a ﬂoor below which we should not allow any government official to fall in her treatment of another person, particularly one
who still retains the presumption of innocence.35 After identifying the
provisions that should be extended, this Part proposes two methods for
effectuating these changes in confession law. One way to extend rights is
through legislative action, and the other is through judicial consideration at the suppression and appellate stages of criminal litigation. Finally,
this Article considers the systemic beneﬁts that would ﬂow from such an
extension and addresses possible counterarguments to these proposals.
I. INSIDER SUSPECTS
This Part establishes why looking at special protections for police
suspects is a particularly salient area of scholarly inquiry. First, it establishes the opacity of our current criminal justice system, locating police
as among a small group of insiders who understand and drive a system
that is increasingly unknown to those on the outside. Given their special
place in the criminal justice system, the preferences police either nego32. See, e.g., Capers, supra note 10, at 873 (arguing “policing the police” will
increase system’s legitimacy and “instill the belief that the law applies to everyone: rich and
poor, black and white, brown and yellow, regardless of whether the individual is wearing a
blue uniform”).
33. See infra section II.B (describing additional interrogation protections for police
officers, such as protection from economic duress).
34. In other words, a provision’s inclusion within a LEOBOR is a necessary, but not
sufficient, condition for extension to all suspects.
35. See infra section IV.B (suggesting protections that should apply to all suspects).
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tiate or lobby for are at once problematic examples of inside favoritism
and tools for reshaping certain aspects of our criminal justice system. On
a larger scale, this Part establishes the idea that studying what those
insiders in the criminal justice system want for themselves gives outsiders
rare and valuable insight for reforming the system more generally.
The mostly unacknowledged procedural favoritism police suspects
receive ﬁts into a larger story about the problematic culture of criminal
justice insiders. Recent criminal justice criticism has uncovered several
problems that stem from the bureaucratic professionalism of the
system.36 Some of these problems include a lack of transparency, lack of
participation by ordinary citizens, and lack of accountability for police
and prosecutors.37 Due to the immense body of legislated criminal law,
an outsized portion of decisionmaking authority has fallen to the discretion of prosecutors and the police.38 Meanwhile, popular participation in
criminal justice, through jury participation and accountability measures
like elections, has fallen away.39
The criminal justice system is an increasingly opaque, unaccountable
machine, known only to those “insiders”—legislators, prosecutors,
defense attorneys, and police—who pursue cases based on their own
political, moral, and professional preferences.40 This system leaves the
rest of us—defendants, victims, members of the public, and legal scholars—out, not only as participants in the system, but even as observers.41
The opacity of the criminal justice machine leads to at least two
interrelated problems. First, it allows criminal justice professionals to
operate in a largely unknown and therefore unchecked sphere, meting
out justice according to their own pressures and incentives and without
taking larger social concerns into their arrest, charging, and plea
36. See Bibas, Machinery, supra note 11, at 29–34 (describing criminal justice system
“tug-of-war” between insiders and outsiders).
37. See id. (noting existence of insider privileges in criminal justice “clouds the law’s
effectiveness and legitimacy and hinders democratic monitoring of government”).
38. See Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanors, 85 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1313, 1328 (2012)
(noting decision to arrest can lead “inexorably” to conviction); William J. Stuntz, Plea
Bargaining and Criminal Law’s Disappearing Shadow, 117 Harv. L. Rev. 2548, 2548 (2004)
(“Criminal law[’s] primary role is . . . to create a menu of options for prosecutors. If the
menu is long enough—and it usually is—prosecutors can dictate the terms of plea
bargains.”).
39. See Stuntz, Collapse, supra note 11, at 7, 159–61 (noting decline of jury trials, rise
of suburban-voter inﬂuence over prosecutor and judge selection, and other changes to
criminal justice system reducing local democratic accountability).
40. See Stephanos Bibas, Transparency and Participation in Criminal Procedure, 81
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 911, 912 (2006) [hereinafter Bibas, Transparency] (“A gulf divides the
knowledgeable, powerful participants inside American criminal justice from the poorly
informed, powerless people outside of it.”).
41. See Jocelyn Simonson, The Criminal Court Audience in a Post-Trial World, 127
Harv. L. Rev. 2173, 2194 (2014) (arguing role of audience as observers has been
discounted, particularly with decline in trials).
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bargaining decisions.42 Second, the shrouded and seemingly arbitrary
way in which criminal justice appears to be distributed undercuts the very
purpose of our criminal justice system—to encourage people to obey the
law.43
Police are central players in this group of unchecked insiders who
control power and knowledge in the criminal justice system.44 In key
ways, police control the criminal justice system more than other insiders
do. For instance, the rise in misdemeanor arrests and citizen encounters
with jails and courts can be traced directly to police policies and
discretion.45 And as the “public face” of the criminal justice “machine,”
interactions with police are often the only part of the legal system that an
arrestee encounters. Many suspects accused of low-level crimes are issued
a ticket by the police and do not see other actors in the system.46 Such
suspects also lose out on the constitutional rights and procedural
protections that later stages of the process provide.47 Therefore, police
42. See Bibas, Transparency, supra note 40, at 945–46 (“Low-visibility procedures
such as charge bargaining and declination frustrate outsiders both because they seem
procedurally unfair or dishonest and because they seem to produce bad substantive
outcomes.”); Josh Bowers, The Normative Case for Normative Grand Juries, 47 Wake
Forest L. Rev. 319, 320 (2012) (“From the public’s perspective, process is inaccessible and
unassessable. The adjudication (and ultimate summary disposition) of [low-level] cases is a
decidedly professional endeavor.”); William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal
Law, 100 Mich. L. Rev. 505, 522 (2001) [hereinafter Stuntz, Pathological Politics] (“[A]
signal that cannot be seen is a very poor signal.”).
43. See Tyler, Why People Obey, supra note 14, at 3–5 (examining “connection
between normative commitment to legal authorities and law-abiding behavior”); Bibas,
Transparency, supra note 40, at 949 (“People respect the law more when it is visibly fair
and when they have some voice or control over its procedures. Procedural fairness,
process control, and trust in insider’s motives contribute greatly to the criminal justice
system’s legitimacy.”).
44. Bibas, Transparency, supra note 40, at 912 (“The[se] insiders—the judges,
prosecutors, police, and defense counsel who regularly handle criminal cases—are
professional repeat players who dominate criminal justice.”); see also Bibas, Machinery,
supra note 11, at 32 (describing extent of police discretion in criminal investigations);
Stuntz, Collapse, supra note 11, at 3 (arguing criminal law gives police wide discretion in
enforcement).
45. See Bowers, supra note 21, at 1697–99 (arguing police are in best position to use
discretion in low-level cases); Charlie Gerstein & J.J. Prescott, Process Costs and Police
Discretion, 128 Harv. L. Rev. F. 268, 296–99 (2015) (arguing solutions to justice system’s
unfairness should focus on police discretion in low-level cases); Issa Kohler-Hausmann,
Managerial Justice and Mass Misdemeanors, 66 Stan. L. Rev. 611, 636 (2014) (showing
police have most discretion of any system actor in many misdemeanor cases); Wayne A.
Logan, After the Cheering Stopped: Decriminalization and Legalism’s Limits, 24 Cornell
J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 319, 334–35 (2014) (arguing “police have powerful individual and
institutional reasons to make arrests”).
46. See Bibas, Machinery, supra note 10, at 32 (“Police decide whom, where, and
what to investigate; whether and whom to arrest and issue citations; and whether and
which charges to ﬁle.”).
47. If a suspect is arrested on minor charges, she may be released with a ticket or
plead to a violation before arraignment. Yet a number of constitutional protections that
expose police misconduct or give a defendant the opportunity to present exculpatory
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decisionmaking is the criminal justice system for an increasing number
of citizens.48
Police, then, are among a very exclusive group of criminal justice
insiders. What it means to be an insider is critical to understanding why
police suspects and defendants matter. Being an insider means possessing knowledge about how an opaque system operates. Police “know the
kinds of crimes, defendants, and sentences that dominate the justice
system. They understand the intricate, technical rules that regulate
arrests, searches and seizures, interrogations, discovery, evidence, and
sentencing, as well as the going rates in plea bargaining.”49 And being an
insider means, to some extent, having control over how laws are written
and enforced. As such, police officers are “a very powerful lobby on
criminal law issues.”50 Police do not lose their insider knowledge or status
upon becoming criminal suspects. In fact, the knowledge they have and
relationships they form as a result of their insider status can appear to
make them virtually above the law because their crimes are both so rarely
reported51 and so rarely prosecuted even when they are reported.52

evidence—the right to an attorney, to confront witnesses, and to challenge arrest
procedures, for instance—only come into play after a suspect has been arraigned. See
Jordan Blair Woods, Decriminalization, Police Authority, and Routine Traffic Stops, 62
UCLA L. Rev. 672, 681 (2015) (arguing police have too much power and authority in
traffic stops, leading to nonreviewable harms to suspects).
48. See Natapoff, supra note 38, at 1362 (“Police and prosecutorial selection
decisions are often treated as posing this sort of procedural legitimacy problem, raising
concerns about process, neutrality and discrimination that are crucial to the legitimacy
inquiry but ancillary to substantive questions of guilt.”).
49. Bibas, Transparency, supra note 40, at 912.
50. Stuntz, Pathological Politics, supra note 42, at 534. Professor William Stuntz
notes, however, that the alliance between prosecutors and police is more nuanced than
the above quote suggests:
Police differ from prosecutors in (at least) two critical ways. Their focus
is on a different stage of criminal proceedings. With some qualiﬁcations,
prosecutors maximize convictions; police are more likely to maximize
arrests. And they are more culturally distinct from the rest of the
population than are prosecutors, so that departmental culture is a more
powerful force in police conduct than it is in prosecutorial behavior.
Id. at 538 (footnote omitted).
51. For instance, a number of scholars have written about the problematic issue of
police “testilying.” See, e.g., Capers, supra note 10, at 870 (noting police lies are
“pervasive” and undercharged); Jennifer E. Koepke, The Failure to Breach the Blue Wall
of Silence: The Circling of the Wagons to Protect Police Perjury, 39 Washburn L.J. 211,
211 (2000) (asserting an officer is more likely to be “struck by lightning” than charged
with perjury); Christopher Slobogin, Testilying: Police Perjury and What to Do About It, 67
U. Colo. L. Rev. 1037, 1040 (1996) (“Lying to convict the innocent is undoubtedly rejected
by most police . . . as immoral and unjustiﬁable. In contrast, lying intended to convict the
guilty . . . is so common and so accepted in some jurisdictions that the police themselves
have come up with a name for it: ‘testilying.’”).
52. See supra note 3 and accompanying text (discussing research and controversy
surrounding nonprosecution of police officers).
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The following parts of this Article show that police receive formal
procedural advantages through negotiated and statutory investigative
protections from interrogation tactics.53 Why does such preferential
treatment for police suspects matter? It matters for at least three reasons.
First, because it violates one of the core foundations of our criminal
justice system: that suspects and defendants receive at least as much
procedural equality in treatment as possible.54 The current state of
interrogation protections gives the most rights to among the most
sophisticated suspects.55 Second, this preferential treatment leads those
outside the justice system to doubt its legitimacy, which may make them
less likely to respect or follow the criminal law.56 Finally, the menu of
preferences police receive may assist criminal justice reform because it
shows what those who possess specialized knowledge and power within
the system get and demand when they imagine themselves as criminal
suspects.57
The notion that those with knowledge and control will, without
checks, do everything they can to maintain their favored status is an old
tale.58 Indeed, constitutional criminal procedure itself is based in large
part on the principle of avoiding this sort of favorable treatment for
some.59 It would not be a stretch to argue that most views of how a fair
criminal justice system operates are predicated on the notion that criminal defendants should be treated as equally as possible, at least as to the
procedural rules that govern their trek through the system.60 While the
53. For a discussion of the informal advantages police receive from prosecutors who
tend to do more investigation and present more evidence to grand juries for police
suspects than other criminal suspects, see Levine, How We Prosecute, supra note 9, at 755
(describing “unusually detailed” grand jury presentations in recent high-proﬁle police
arrests).
54. Whether these procedures should be reduced for police or applied more broadly
to criminal defendants is a question this Article addresses in Part IV.
55. See infra sections II.A, III.A (discussing procedural protections given to police
officers throughout all stages of criminal justice system).
56. See infra section III.B (outlining how insider advantages in criminal justice
system harm system’s legitimacy).
57. See infra sections II.A, IV.A (discussing pervasive procedural bias in favor of
sophisticated suspects).
58. The animus behind the separation of powers is often linked to this very concept.
See Martin H. Redish & Elizabeth J. Cisar, “If Angels Were to Govern”: The Need for
Pragmatic Formalism in Separation of Powers Theory, 41 Duke L.J. 449, 451 (1991)
(“Almost every aspect of [the framers’] ingenious political structure was in some way
related to their implicit assumption that, simply put, ‘power corrupts.’”).
59. See Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956) (“There can be no equal justice
where the kind of trial a man gets depends on the amount of money he has.”).
60. See William J. Stuntz, Unequal Justice, 121 Harv. L. Rev. 1969, 1975–76 (2008)
[hereinafter Stuntz, Unequal Justice] (“In order to identify and combat inequality, one
must ﬁrst know what the term means. My deﬁnition is conventional: an egalitarian justice
system treats morally like cases alike.”); Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124
Harv. L. Rev. 747, 791 (2011) (“[T]here are many other liberty guarantees in the
Constitution that are inﬂected with equality concerns; many of the criminal procedure
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constitutional criminal procedure revolution has been much maligned in
recent years,61 few would disagree with the concept that equality was the
animating principle that motivated the Warren Court, which was
responsible for the extension of numerous criminal procedural rights to
all suspects.62

amendments of the Bill of Rights come to mind.”). Of course, formally attempting to
create equal rules does not ensure equal treatment, as there are many discretionary
decisions that can be distributed unequally. See, e.g., Levine, How We Prosecute, supra
note 9, at 756–57 (describing unequal outcomes resulting from vast discretion prosecutors
enjoy in initial charging decision). But just because people are treated unequally does not
mean that enshrining unequal treatment in formal law is an acceptable form of criminal
procedural practice. For an argument that formal equality is not always the most
important value in criminal procedure, see Stephanos Bibas, Forgiveness in Criminal
Procedure, 4 Ohio St. J. Crim. L. 329, 347 (2007) (“Treating like cases alike is a value, but
not the only one. Equality also requires treating unlike cases unlike, and forgiveness is a
factor that makes cases unlike and worthy of different sentences. Moreover, equality
should not trump all other values.”).
61. See, e.g., Stuntz, Collapse, supra note 11, at 218 (“[T]he justice system grew less
egalitarian through the [Warren] Court’s efforts to make it more so.”).
62. See, e.g., Joseph L. Hoffmann & Nancy J. King, Rethinking the Federal Role in
State Criminal Justice, 84 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 791, 801 (2009) (arguing focus of criminal
procedure revolution was “to force the states to bring their criminal justice systems into
compliance with the fundamental ideals of equality and fairness guaranteed by the United
States Constitution.”); Stuntz, Unequal Justice, supra note 60, at 2040 (“‘Equal justice
under law’—the phrase resonates because of its seeming redundancy. Unequal justice is an
oxymoron; law makes justice both equal and just. Those four words are really a longwinded substitute for one: ‘justice.’”). While the unequal distribution of criminal justice
has been the subject of some scholarship, such scholarship tends to focus on wealthy,
white-collar defendants and on sentencing disparities. See, e.g., Andrew Weissmann &
Joshua A. Block, White-Collar Defendants and White-Collar Crimes, 116 Yale L.J. Pocket
Part 286, 288–89 (2007), http://yalelawjournal.org/forum/white-collar-defendants-andwhite-collar-crimes [http://perma.cc/UT6E-J7BF] (arguing it is wrong to treat those who
commit white collar crimes differently from those who commit other crimes due to
correlation with race and class); see also James Q. Whitman, Harsh Justice 47 (2003)
(arguing some prosecutors have insisted on harsher white-collar sentences to avoid reputation as unfair toward poor defendants).
But the treatment of these defendants is not an apt comparison to the treatment of
police defendants because of the nature of the law and jurisdiction that applies to whitecollar defendants. Much white-collar criminalization occurs at the federal level. See
Lauren M. Ouziel, Legitimacy and Federal Criminal Enforcement Power, 123 Yale L.J.
2134, 2246 (2014) (“Unlike large-scale white-collar or regulatory crimes, which typically
require expertise and resources more available at the federal level, the default forum for
street crimes is local.”). Most police crimes, like most other criminal law enforcement,
occur at the state and local level. Moreover, unless a white-collar defendant is being
charged with a typical state crime, such as theft, the laws themselves are substantively quite
different than the laws that govern most “ordinary” crime. Police, on the other hand, are
accused of crimes such as murder, assault, robbery, and perjury—crimes that are more
closely aligned with traditional state criminal laws and processes. This is not to say that
white-collar defendants should get preferential treatment any more than police should. It
is only to say that, as far as specially treated defendants go, we can probably learn more
from police defendants than from white-collar defendants.
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Recently, the notion of the importance of equal distribution of
criminal procedures to the legitimacy of the criminal justice system has
been strengthened by the empirical work of Professor Tom Tyler and
others. These scholars show that when citizens do not trust the justice
system, they have less incentive to follow the law. Moreover, they show
that the way people are treated by system actors has as much of an impact
on the way they feel about the system as the substantive outcomes of their
cases.63 While much of the work focuses on the interactions citizens have
with particular criminal justice actors—police and judges—it also shows
that people feel that the criminal justice system is more legitimate when
procedures are distributed equally and when law enforcement officials
appear unmotivated by bias for or against certain groups.64
In other words, the preferential procedures that police defendants
receive are problematic from the perspective of the way criminal
procedure is designed to work. These defendants’ preferential treatment
offends the appearance of impartiality, and this has negative effects for
the way people view the law and the legitimacy of the legal system.65
There are at least two ways to resolve the problem of preferential
procedural protections for police.66 The simpler, perhaps more intuitive,
avenue is to take away the systemic favoritism that works in favor of police
suspects. In particular, for purposes of this Article, this means abolishing
LEOBORs entirely.67 The second, more conceptually and practically
difficult, solution is to extend some of these protective mechanisms to
other criminal defendants. This is the path this Article recommends
because police officers’ negotiated preferences are a valuable tool for
understanding how interrogations work and how they should work.68
Police suspects receive the beneﬁts of procedural preferences gained
through their intimate knowledge of how the criminal justice system
63. See Tyler, Why People Obey, supra note 14, at 5–7 (describing importance of
normative and procedural justice).
64. See id. at 73 (noting “‘perception of unequal treatment . . . is the single most
important source of popular dissatisfaction with the American legal system’” (quoting
Austin Sarat, Studying American Legal Culture: An Assessment of Survey Evidence, 11 Law
& Soc’y Rev. 427, 434 (1977))).
65. See Levine, Who Shouldn’t Prosecute, supra note 3 (manuscript at 9–16)
(discussing appearance of bias as threat to legitimacy of legal system).
66. See supra note 19 (presenting third way to deal with these rights outside scope of
this Article).
67. See infra Part IV (noting most scholars who have addressed LEOBORs have made
this suggestion).
68. See infra Part IV (discussing reasons police-negotiated protections are useful
models for improving interrogations). As this Article discusses later, an interrogation
protection’s existence in a LEOBOR is not a sufficient condition for extending that
protection. The same characteristic that gives LEOBORs their power—they are drafted by
experts who imagine themselves as suspects—also raises the important problem that they
may be a corrupting overprotection rather than a valuable and necessary protection. Thus,
each interrogation protection this Article recommends extending has an independent
value.
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works and how they can best shield themselves from its operations. Police
are the interrogators: They know exactly what tactics are most likely to
induce a confession, whether truthful or not. Their LEOBORs reﬂect this
knowledge.69
At ﬁrst blush, the notion that experts have designed procedures for
themselves when they imagine themselves as the object of interrogation
may lead to a swift conclusion that these preferences are the product of
unfair self-dealing.70 One might well see the appearance and legitimacy
problems they create and insist that they be eradicated.71 This Article
argues instead that the interrogation rights provided by LEOBORs are a
politically feasible and informative starting point to reimagine interrogation protections that are more sophisticated,72 in addition to being
more in line with our current notions of humane treatment of those who
are suspected of violating the criminal law.73 In fact, the interrogation
protections that ﬂow from police suspects’ very “insiderness” are a way to
reinvigorate the debate over how to protect criminal suspects, among the
least favored groups in our society.74
II. FORMAL PROTECTIONS FOR POLICE FROM POLICE INTERROGATION
Part I established why looking at the way law enforcement officers, as
criminal justice insiders, want to be treated when they become criminal
suspects can lead to a better understanding of the usually opaque world
of criminal justice. This Part focuses more closely on the speciﬁc, formal
procedural preferences police suspects receive from the Supreme
Court,75 as well as from LEOBORs. Recently, criticism has begun to focus
on how these protections unfairly skew the criminal justice system in
favor of police suspects.76 Yet the umbrella of protections provided by
69. See infra section II.B (discussing protections officers receive when interrogated).
70. See infra section IV.A (characterizing LEOBORs as protecting least vulnerable
suspects).
71. See infra section IV.A (suggesting eradicating protections could enhance
legitimacy).
72. See infra section III.A (examining how current interrogation practices yield false
confessions).
73. See infra section IV.B.2 (arguing enormous costs of unfair treatment of suspects
outweigh any minimal beneﬁts from such tactics).
74. See James Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of Prosecutorial Power, 94 Harv. L. Rev.
1521, 1555 (1981) (discussing concern that current operation of criminal law means “least
favored members of the community—racial and ethnic minorities, social outcasts, the
poor—will be treated most harshly”).
75. See Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 497–98 (1967) (protecting police from
having to make inculpatory statements under threat of losing their jobs). The rest of the
protections this Article discusses are found in LEOBORs.
76. This scrutiny primarily focuses on waiting periods before questioning of police
officers. This provision became particularly intense in the wake of the arrest and indictment of the officers accused in Freddie Gray’s death in Baltimore. See Justin Fenton &
Justin George, Five Officers in Freddie Gray Case Gave Accounts of Incident, Balt. Sun
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most of these formal rights are more detailed and yield far more insight
than recent commentary allows. In fact, numerous scholars have argued
for decades that criminal suspects’ panoply of rights do not sufficiently
protect them from coercive interrogation tactics.77 The tactics they allude
to are among the very same ones disallowed by LEOBORs.
This Part argues that the formal interrogation protections police
suspects receive protect them from a host of investigative techniques that
are considered part of the “playbook” when it comes to interrogating
nonpolice suspects. It ﬁrst discusses current Fifth Amendment and
Fourteenth Amendment protection for nonpolice suspects and notes
that police officers, as the most sophisticated suspects in the interrogation context, are already at an advantage over other suspects. It then
turns to the added layer of affirmative protections police have negotiated
or lobbied for themselves.
The ﬁrst section in this Part describes the well-trod constitutional
rights that are meant to protect criminal suspects from coerced
confessions. It then shows how police are already perhaps the most
advantaged suspects when it comes to interrogatory protection because
they are typically the interrogators. The next subpart will show that their
additional affirmative protections further invert the purpose of constitutional protections by giving already sophisticated suspects an extra
layer of rights that the rest of us do not receive.

(Apr. 23, 2015, 10:30 AM), http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/crime/blog/
bs-md-freddie-gray-mayor-comments-20150422-story.html [http://perma.cc/4Q9N-WEV6]
(describing Baltimore Mayor Stephanie Rawlings-Blake’s claim Maryland’s LEOBOR was
“delay[ing] . . . the investigation”). Attention toward the delay in a charging decision in
the shooting death of twelve-year-old Tamir Rice in Cleveland also shined light on investigative protections for police officers. See Shaun King, Find Out Why 166 Days After Tamir
Rice’s Death, Officers Haven’t Been Interviewed by Investigators, Daily Kos (May 13, 2015,
9:02 AM), http://www.dailykos.com/story/2015/05/13/1384436/-166-days-after-theykilled-Tamir-Rice-officers-have-still-not-been-interviewed-by-investigators [http://perma.cc
/Y8WG-QDSE] (claiming delay was due to Garrity rights); see also Kevin M. Keenan &
Samuel Walker, An Impediment to Police Accountability? An Analysis of Statutory Law
Enforcement Officers’ Bill of Rights, 14 B.U. Pub. Int. L.J. 185, 212 (2005) (“One of the
most publicized and controversial issues related to the rights of police officers involves
formal ‘waiting periods’ before formal investigations or interrogations can begin.”); infra
section IV.A (providing more in-depth discussion of these protections).
77. See, e.g., Brandon L. Garrett, Judging Innocence, 108 Colum. L. Rev. 55, 122
(2008) [hereinafter Garrett, Judging Innocence] (linking confessions and interrogations
to erroneous convictions); Charles J. Ogletree, Are Confessions Really Good for the Soul?:
A Proposal to Mirandize Miranda, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 1826, 1827–28 (1987) (arguing
Miranda warnings are not effective in practice); Eve Brensike Primus, The Future of
Confession Law: Toward Rules for the Voluntariness Test, 114 Mich. L. Rev. 1, 3 (2015)
(discussing weaknesses with voluntariness test); Charles D. Weisselberg, Mourning
Miranda, 96 Calif. L. Rev. 1519, 1521 (2008) (“The best evidence shows that, as a
protective device, Miranda is largely dead.”).
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Constitutional Confession Law Favors Sophisticated Suspects

Two strands of Supreme Court doctrine determine whether a confession is admissible. First, any suspect who has been arrested must be
given notice of certain constitutional rights. Miranda warnings, based on
the eponymous and famous case, include the right to remain silent, the
right to an attorney, and notice that any statements made to officers can
be used against a suspect in later proceedings.78 Both of these doctrines
favor sophisticated suspects, usually wealthy, educated or recidivist
interrogees, over unsophisticated suspects, often young, mentally ill, or
mentally disadvantaged interrogees.
Miranda is among the most hotly contested Supreme Court criminal
procedure rulings.79 For the purposes of this Article, a couple of the
critiques are particularly apt. First, Miranda applies only in strictly
denominated “formal” interrogations, allowing law enforcement officers
to question suspects without advising them of their rights in a host of
situations that may lead an unwary suspect to confess.80 Second, and
perhaps most relevant, most suspects waive their Miranda rights.81 Some,
of course, do so because they desire to make a truthful confession to a
crime they committed. But many others do so for a host of reasons that
do not lead to the conclusion that their confessions are the product of a
voluntary waiver of rights.82
The second strand of doctrine is the voluntariness test, which courts
use at suppression hearings to determine whether, given the “totality of
the circumstances” a confession is admissible.83 This test, according to
the Supreme Court, balances “the complex of values implicated in police
questioning of a suspect.”84 On one side of the scale is the notion of the
“need for police questioning as a tool for the effective enforcement of
criminal laws.”85 Without wide latitude for police questioning, “the
security of all would be diminished.”86 On the other side are a far more
78. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478–79 (1966) (outlining procedural
safeguards required to protect suspect’s right to remain silent).
79. Compare Stephen J. Schulhofer, Reconsidering Miranda, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. 435,
442–43 (1987) [hereinafter Schulhofer, Reconsidering] (defending Miranda against its
critics), with Weisselberg, supra note 77, at 1521 (pronouncing Miranda dead).
80. See Aurora Maoz, Note, Empty Promises: Miranda Warnings in Noncustodial
Interrogations, 110 Mich. L. Rev. 1309, 1321 (2012) (noting police training manuals advise
police to question suspects in non-Miranda settings).
81. See Saul M. Kassin, Inside Interrogation: Why Innocent People Confess, 32 Am. J.
Trial Advoc. 525, 537 (2009) [hereinafter Kassin, Inside Interrogation] (“[F]our out of
every ﬁve people waive [Miranda] rights . . . .”).
82. See Ogletree, supra note 77, at 1827–28 (explaining several misunderstandings
that lead suspects to waive rights).
83. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 223–25 (1973) (discussing factors
courts consider when “assessing the voluntariness of a consent”).
84. Id. at 224–25.
85. Id. at 225.
86. Id.
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nebulous “set of values” that reﬂect “society’s deeply felt belief that the
criminal law cannot be used as an instrument of unfairness, and that the
possibility of unfair and even brutal police tactics poses a real and serious
threat to civilized notions of justice.”87 Thus, ensuring that a statement is
voluntary “‘enforces the strongly felt attitude of our society that
important human values are sacriﬁced where an agency of the government, in the course of securing a conviction, wrings a confession out of
an accused against his will.’”88
In reality, the voluntariness standard puts almost no restrictions on
what police may do to induce a confession. The Court has not held any
tactic in and of itself unconstitutional, short of physically beating a
confession out of suspects,89 isolating them for sixteen days before
interrogation,90 or interrogating them for thirty-six hours straight.91
Importantly, the voluntariness test requires no speciﬁc protection from
types of questions, the setting of an interrogation, the length of an
interrogation, the number of interrogators, or any other speciﬁc type of
interrogation technique.92 Indeed, courts have routinely held that eco-

87. Id.
88. Id. (quoting Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 206–07 (1960)).
89. See Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 286 (1936) (holding confession obtained
through physical abuse is not admissible).
90. See Davis v. North Carolina, 384 U.S. 737, 752 (1961) (holding confession was
rendered inadmissible when suspect was held for sixteen days without any communication
before interrogation).
91. See Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 154 (1944) (ﬁnding nonstop
interrogation for thirty-six hours “inherently coercive”).
92. See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 444 (2000) (“[T]he totality-of-thecircumstances test . . . is more difficult than Miranda for law enforcement officers to
conform to, and for courts to apply in a consistent manner.”). As with Miranda, critics of
the voluntariness test have argued that it is both over- and underprotective of criminal
suspects. Some argue that it is too hard for officers to know ex ante whether they have
coerced a suspect who confesses. See, e.g., Mark A. Godsey, Rethinking the Involuntary
Confession Rule: Toward A Workable Test for Identifying Compelled Self-Incrimination,
93 Calif. L. Rev. 465, 469–70 (2005) (noting factors about suspect’s particular vulnerability
not known to officers at time of interrogation can subsequently invalidate confession);
Lawrence Herman, The Supreme Court, the Attorney General, and the Good Old Days of
Police Interrogation, 48 Ohio St. L.J. 733, 745 (1987) (“Under the ‘totality of the
circumstances’ approach, virtually everything is relevant and nothing is determinative. If
you place a premium on clarity, this is not a good sign.”). Others believe that the totality of
the circumstances test leads to the suppression of important evidence against guilty
suspects. See Paul G. Cassell, Protecting the Innocent from False Confessions and Lost
Confessions—and from Miranda, 88 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 497, 498 (1998)
[hereinafter Cassell, Protecting the Innocent] (arguing “restrictions on interrogations can
reduce the number of confessions police obtain”). Those who focus on underprotection
argue that it allows the police to do almost anything to a suspect, short of beating a
confession out of her. Nor does the reviewing judge need to take into account inherently
coercive settings and techniques that produce involuntary and in an alarming number of
cases, false confessions. See Herman, supra, at 752 (arguing vague rules will lead
unscrupulous officers to “go to the brink” to obtain confession).
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nomic duress,93 lengthy interrogations,94 sleep deprivation combined
with middle-of-the-night questioning,95 refusal to allow basic physical
necessities,96 lies about the severity of charges or evidence in the case,97
threats to family members’ welfare,98 inducements in the form of
leniency or other promises,99 and other forms of psychologically abusive
behavior do not render confessions involuntary.
A particularly salient critique of the constitutional protections
governing interrogation is that they favor sophisticated suspects over
more vulnerable ones. Critics of Miranda have argued for decades that
93. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Sanney v. Montanye, 500 F.2d 411, 415–16 (2d Cir.
1974) (ﬁnding threat of discharge from job as “driver’s assistant” not “substantial economic sanction” like loss of police officer position).
94. See Kassin, Inside Interrogation, supra note 81, at 534 (“[A]mong proven false
confessions in which time records were kept, the length of interrogation was over sixteen
hours.”); Welsh S. White, What Is an Involuntary Confession Now?, 50 Rutgers L. Rev.
2001, 2046–47 (1998) [hereinafter White, Involuntary Confession] (noting courts have
upheld interrogation sessions of nine hours or more, ﬁnding this did not render
confessions involuntary).
95. See, e.g., State v. Doody, 930 P.2d 440, 446 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1996) (ﬁnding thirteenhour interrogation that began “in the evening” and carried on “without signiﬁcant
breaks” did not render confession involuntary).
96. See id. (upholding statements as voluntary after long interrogation in “absence of
evidence that a lack of food and sleep contributed to the statements” (citing State v.
Taylor, 537 P.2d 938, 951 (Ariz. 1975))).
97. United States v. Jacques, 744 F.3d 804, 808 (1st Cir. 2014) (holding confession
voluntary when federal agents told suspect confessing would lead to softer treatment while
not confessing would lead to maximum sentence); see also Johnson v. Pollard, 559 F.3d
746, 749 (7th Cir. 2009) (holding police officer’s lie that suspect failed polygraph test did
not make confession involuntary); United States v. Meirovitz, 918 F.2d 1376, 1379 (8th Cir.
1990) (ﬁnding threat of long sentence for refusal to confess did not make confession
involuntary).
98. See United States v. Hufstetler, 782 F.3d 19, 24–25 (1st Cir. 2015) (ﬁnding threat
to detain suspect’s girlfriend and comment that “I certainly don’t want to see those kids be
without their mother” was not coercive); Brown v. Horell, 644 F.3d 969, 980, 983 (9th Cir.
2011) (holding detective coerced Brown into confessing by conditioning Brown’s ability to
be with his child on cooperation with police but also ﬁnding state supreme court’s
decision under review was not “unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme
Court law”).
99. See Jacques, 744 F.3d at 808 (upholding statements as voluntary despite agents
repeatedly “inform[ing] Jacques that an honest confession might lead to softer treatment
by the prosecutor and the sentencing judge, while a failure to cooperate was likely to
result in the maximum sentence”); United States v. Villalpando, 588 F.3d 1124, 1129 (7th
Cir. 2009) (ﬁnding confession voluntary despite detective indicating she would sit down
with Drug Enforcement Administration in exchange for suspect’s cooperation for drugrelated investigation and informing suspect “we don’t have to charge you”); see also
Miriam S. Gohara, A Lie for a Lie: False Confessions and the Case for Reconsidering the
Legality of Deceptive Interrogation Techniques, 33 Fordham Urb. L.J. 791, 792 (2006)
(noting one of later-exonerated “Central Park Five” was told he could go home after
confessing); White, Involuntary Confession, supra note 94, at 2043 (noting “certain
interrogation tactics—especially tactics involving direct or implied promises of leniency . . .
are also likely to precipitate untrustworthy confessions”).
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the warnings are incomprehensible for a large number of suspects. For
instance, former public defender Professor Charles Ogletree wrote that
“notwithstanding the warnings, [his clients] believed either that their
silence could be used against them as evidence of guilt or, more frequently, that by remaining silent they would forfeit their opportunity to
be released on bail.”100 Additionally, studies have shown that many
defendants lack the reading proﬁciency to understand Miranda warnings
delivered in written form, which requires roughly a tenth-grade reading
level.101
Very few suspects understand or invoke their Miranda rights,102 and
the voluntariness test rarely leads to suppression.103 Such a state of affairs
results in the unintended inversion of the goal of the Court’s Miranda
ruling—encouraging guilty suspects to confess while ensuring that all
suspects know their rights. Instead, “sophisticated suspects have a right to
be free from questioning altogether—not simply free from coercive
questioning—while unsophisticated suspects have very nearly no protection at all. The ﬁrst group receives more than it deserves, while the
second receives less than it needs.”104
Even those who believe that the current state of regulation is
adequate anticipate that suspects have a sophisticated understanding of
the criminal justice system. Arguing that the right to remain silent “helps
only the guilty,” Professor Stephanos Bibas posits that suspects confess for
several positive reasons: “[M]any . . . know that they will be convicted
[and] . . . gain important beneﬁts from early confessions,” including
“downgrade[d] or drop[ped] charges,” “mercy at sentencing,” and
“speed[ing] up their post-sentence moves to long-term conﬁnement”
because “jails . . . are often less pleasant than . . . prisons.”105 If it is true
100. Ogletree, supra note 77, at 1828–29.
101. D. Christopher Dearborn, “You Have the Right to an Attorney,” but Not Right
Now: Combating Miranda’s Failure by Advancing the Point of Attachment Under Article
XII of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, 44 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 359, 374–75 (2011)
(“Many of the words used in typical Miranda warnings require at least a tenth-grade
reading level. In contrast, one 2003 study found that seventy percent of inmates read at a
sixth grade level or below.” (footnote omitted)).
102. See Kassin, Inside Interrogation, supra note 81, at 534–35 (noting “misinformmation makes people vulnerable to manipulation by a host of inﬂuences”).
103. See, e.g., Primus, supra note 77, at 3 (“[T]he voluntariness doctrine . . . almost
always arriv[es] at the conclusion that what the police did was, all things considered,
acceptable.”).
104. William J. Stuntz, Miranda’s Mistake, 99 Mich. L. Rev. 975, 976–77 (2001)
[hereinafter Stuntz, Mistake]; see also Tracey L. Meares, What’s Wrong with Gideon, 70 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 215, 228 (2003) (“Miranda’s waiver and invocation system turns the focus of
courts toward an assessment of ritual in which suspects sort themselves into groups of
those willing to talk to police and those not.”). But see Schulhofer, Reconsidering, supra
note 79, at 447–48 (arguing even sophisticated suspect would feel pressure to talk to
police).
105. Stephanos Bibas, The Right to Remain Silent Helps Only the Guilty, 88 Iowa L.
Rev. 421, 424–25 (2003) [hereinafter Bibas, Right to Remain Silent].
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that a large number of suspects do confess for such reasons, these
suspects must be quite sophisticated, at least in their knowledge of the
criminal justice system. They must understand the “beneﬁts” they will
obtain for confessing early, both from prosecutors in terms of charge
reduction and from judges in terms of more lenient sentencing. They
must understand the difference between prison and jail and the tradeoffs
between asserting their constitutional rights and a quick resolution to
their case. The picture painted here is of a sophisticated, repeat-player
suspect who makes rational choices unaffected by the inherent coerciveness of arrest and interrogation.
Similarly, more sophisticated suspects are less likely to fall prey to
interrogation techniques that might lead to an involuntary or even false
confession. This protects “savvy suspects . . . deﬁned by either wealth
or . . . experience dealing with the system, something that recidivists
naturally possess.”106 By contrast, “vulnerable suspects, which includes
those with the least experience dealing with the system, are helped, if at
all, only indirectly.”107 These results have been the basis for much
criticism of confession law from a distributive perspective.108
A large majority of suspects either answer questions in non-Miranda
settings or waive their rights.109 Modern police training teaches detectives
how to use psychological techniques, including threats and promises, to
induce a suspect to confess.110 Studies have shown that young, mentally
disadvantaged, and mentally ill suspects are far more susceptible to the
trickery, inducements, and threats that constitute the interrogation

106. Stuntz, Mistake, supra note 104, at 977.
107. Id.
108. See id. at 977–78 (“In distributive terms, the best system is probably one in which
everyone talks—or, at the least, one in which everyone submits to questioning—but where
police tactics are effectively regulated. Miranda reversed that outcome, leaving only some
suspects exposed to questioning but also leaving police tactics unregulated.”); see also
Barry C. Feld, Juveniles’ Competence to Exercise Miranda Rights: An Empirical Study of
Policy and Practice, 91 Minn. L. Rev. 26, 100 (2006) (arguing current “legal framework is
inadequate to protect younger juveniles”); Andrew E. Taslitz, Judging Jena’s D.A.: The
Prosecutor and Racial Esteem, 44 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 393, 417–18 (2009) (“Police are
also more likely to presume guilt when questioning minorities, thereby eliciting defensive
responses, which police interpret as deceptive; this in turn leads to harsher interrogation
techniques . . . .”).
109. See Kassin, Inside Interrogation, supra note 81, at 537 (“It turns out, however,
that four out of every ﬁve people waive these rights, and innocent people in particular are
the most likely to do so.”); see also Primus, supra note 77, at 14–22 (discussing how Court
has gutted Miranda by limiting situations in which police are required to give warnings and
increasing requirements for courts to determine when suspect invoked rights).
110. See infra section IV.B (discussing such techniques); see also Steven A. Drizin &
Richard A. Leo, The Problem of False Confessions in the Post-DNA World, 82 N.C. L. Rev.
891, 918–19 (2004) (“Regretfully, most interrogation training manuals . . . give no thought
to how the methods they advocate communicate psychologically coercive messages and
sometimes lead the innocent to confess.” (footnote omitted)).
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playbook than their older, mentally well counterparts.111 The number of
false confessions that judges have refused to suppress among these
vulnerable groups belies the notion that a reviewing court will be able to
sort out these suspects from others.112 Simply put, trial judges and
reviewing courts are loath to suppress damning evidence without a clear
showing that a confession was obtained through brutal tactics. Thus,
confessions are rarely suppressed based on either the suspect’s susceptibility or the officer’s interrogation techniques, particularly once Miranda
rights have been provided and waived.113
Even if the truthfulness of a confession is not in question, the tactics
police use, particularly on vulnerable suspects, offend many closely held
notions of humane treatment in a civilized society. Justice Frankfurter
put the matter squarely, stating that “not the least signiﬁcant test of the
quality of a civilization is its treatment of those charged with crime.”114
Speaking of threats to a suspect’s family, the Ninth Circuit made a similar
point in a case where it could not give the defendant relief for procedural reasons.115 Likewise, depriving a suspect of sleep, food, or water,
threatening her with the loss of family, making false promises of leniency,
or threatening to introduce fabricated evidence may induce confessions,
but such tactics also directly contravene the humaneness of American
society.116
The confession literature captures some of the distributional
problems with interrogation protection for wealthy or “sophisticated”
111. See Drizin & Leo, supra note 110, at 970–71 (“The unique vulnerability of the
mentally retarded to psychological interrogation techniques and the risk that such
techniques when applied to the mentally retarded may produce false confessions is welldocumented in the false confession literature.”); id. at 973–74 (discussing prevalence of
mental illness among study of exonerees); see also Kassin, Inside Interrogation, supra note
81, at 533–34 (“That juveniles are vulnerable is not particularly surprising . . . . To the
adolescent, not fully focused on long-term consequences, confession may serve as an
expedient way out of a stressful situation.”).
112. See Drizin & Leo, supra note 110, at 944–45, 963–71 (discussing false-confession
cases where suspect was young or mentally retarded).
113. See Godsey, supra note 92, at 513 (“After Miranda warnings have been provided
to a suspect and waived, most courts simply presume that any confession that follows was
made voluntarily.”).
114. Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 729 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
115. United States v. Tingle, 658 F.2d 1332, 1336 (9th Cir. 1981) (“The relationship
between parent and child embodies a primordial and fundamental value of our society.
When law enforcement officers deliberately prey upon the maternal instinct and inculcate
fear in a mother that she will not see her child in order to elicit ‘cooperation,’ they
exert . . . ‘improper inﬂuence’ . . . .” (quoting Malloy v. Hogan, 278 U.S. 1, 8 (1964))).
116. See infra section IV.B (advocating use of only those interrogation techniques that
advance “humane treatment of suspects”). This criticism of our criminal justice system
most often appears in the death penalty context. See, e.g., William J. Brennan, Jr., In
Defense of Dissents, 37 Hastings L.J. 427, 436 (1986) (arguing death penalty has no place
in civilized society and “the state, even as it punishes, must treat its citizens in a manner
consistent with their intrinsic worth as human beings”).
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recidivist suspects as opposed to their more vulnerable counterparts.117
Yet it leaves out perhaps the most sophisticated group of suspects: the
police. The police are the interrogators. No level of privilege or education makes up for the intimate insider knowledge that police possess
through their training and ﬁrst-hand experience. Few groups are better
situated to refuse to talk in informal, non-Miranda interrogations. Few
groups are better informed about what it means to invoke, and continue
to invoke, their rights to silence and counsel. No group is more aware of
the psychological interrogation techniques that police use to encourage
confessions. Thus, any critique of confession jurisprudence does well to
take this group into account. The police, because of their nearly unique
insider status,118 already skew the relationship between protection and
sophistication more than almost any other group. This is problematic
both for those who believe there are too many coerced confessions and
for those who believe sophisticated suspects are able to pervert the truthseeking balance the Court strives for in its confession jurisprudence.119
Already then, the police are in a particularly privileged position
when it comes to asserting their rights to silence and counsel in the face
of interrogation. Yet this most sophisticated group of suspects, as
described below, enjoys numerous additional positive protections from
interrogation. It is hard to imagine a more backward regime from the
perspective of distributive justice in criminal law.120
B.

Additional Formal Protections for the Police

This section looks at the additional formal protections police receive
when they are interrogated. Police suspects beneﬁt from a combination
of two formal protections not extended to most other suspects. First,
Supreme Court jurisprudence protects police from the economic duress
inherent in a choice between incriminating themselves and losing their
jobs. Second, LEOBORs grant police dozens of additional affirmative
protections. When compared with the vague and weak protections for
other classes of suspects, the strong protections for police suspects raise a
host of systemic problems that threaten the meaning and legitimacy of
the criminal law.
LEOBORs ﬁrst came about in the wake of the Supreme Court’s 1967
decision in Garrity v. New Jersey, which protects police from having to
decide between incriminating themselves and losing their employ117. See, e.g., Stuntz, Mistake, supra note 104, at 977 (discussing sophisticated
suspects).
118. See supra Part I (discussing disconnect between criminal justice insiders and
outsiders).
119. See supra note 92 (contrasting scholars who believe voluntariness test in
confession jurisprudence is underprotective of criminal suspects with those who believe
test is overprotective).
120. See infra section IV.C (acknowledging many believe criminal law should make
special exceptions for police but arguing those exceptions should not be procedural).
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ment.121 Garrity arose out of an investigation, prosecution, and eventual
conviction of a number of New Jersey police officers for a ticket-ﬁxing
scheme.122 Officer Garrity and others answered certain questions, and
their answers were ultimately used to secure convictions against them.
The officers later claimed that the introduction of their inculpating
statements violated their Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. They asserted that their choice, to speak or lose their jobs, was
akin to no choice at all.123 Reversing the convictions, the Court agreed:
The choice given petitioners was either to forfeit their jobs or to
incriminate themselves. The option to lose their means of
livelihood or to pay the penalty of self-incrimination is the
antithesis of free choice to speak out or to remain silent . . . . We
think the statements were infected by the coercion inherent in
this scheme of questioning and cannot be sustained as
voluntary . . . .124
The Court speciﬁcally denied that its decision was based on the
defendants’ status as police officers. This right “extend[ed] to all, whether they [we]re policemen or other members of our body politic.”125
The opinion’s scope, however, is quite limited in many situations because
there are few other suspects who are being questioned about on-the-job
wrongdoing and criminal activity by the same authority.126 In other
words, the opinion says nothing about what happens if a criminal suspect
is given the choice between confession and missing days of work. It does
not technically violate Garrity’s rule to indirectly impact a suspect’s work
prospects, by for instance, detaining her until she loses her job or

121. 385 U.S. 493, 500 (1983) (“We now hold the protection of the individual under
the Fourteenth Amendment against coerced statements prohibits use in subsequent
criminal proceedings of statements obtained under threat of removal from office . . . .”).
The case, in combination with a number of other Supreme Court decisions, has come to
stand for the problematic principle that a prosecutor may not use a compelled statement
from a police officer against him in a criminal proceeding. In fact, some courts have read
the case to prevent prosecutors from using any evidence that they cannot prove was
gathered without any knowledge of the immunized statement. See Steven D. Clymer,
Compelled Statements from Police Officers and Garrity Immunity, 76 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1309,
1312–13 (2001) [hereinafter Clymer, Compelled Statements] (arguing Garrity immunity
has been extended too far). While a fascinating issue in its own right, the problem of using
immunity is not the focus of this Article.
122. See Garrity, 385 U.S. at 494 (providing background to case).
123. See id. at 495 (summarizing petitioners’ claims).
124. Id. at 497–98.
125. Id. at 500. In a later case, the Court speciﬁcally held that Garrity’s rule was
applicable to architects threatened with the suspension of their public contracts. See
Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 83–84 (1973) (“We fail to see a difference of constitutional magnitude between the threat of job loss to an employee of the State, and a threat
of loss of contracts to a contractor.”).
126. Clymer, Compelled Statements, supra note 121, at 1317 (ﬁnding rationale for
Garrity was that “state’s threat to ﬁre the police officers unless they gave statements was an
unconstitutional condition”).
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threatening to tell an employer about suspected criminality,127 though
the result may be the same “economic execution” that police officers
face.128
At the time the Court decided Garrity, police unions did not feel that
it went far enough to protect their members from intrusive internal and
potentially criminal investigations.129 In fact, Garrity, the Warren Court’s
other decisions, and the civil rights reform aspirations of the 1960s led
both police unions and politicians to believe that police officers had
fewer rights than they needed to protect themselves from misconduct
investigations.130 As Professors Kevin Keenan and Samuel Walker note,
the police responded by “adopting many of the tactics of their civil rights
critics: public protests, assertion of their group rights, and lobbying for
legislative protections.”131
In hindsight, and particularly at this moment, critics see these bills
of rights as a way for police unions to corrupt and elude fair investigation.132 The comments surrounding the ﬁrst federal LEOBOR bill
suggest, however, that rank-and-ﬁle officers sincerely believed they were
being treated as “constitutionally inferior” to other citizens.133 Their
political supporters agreed. In 1972, then-future New York City Mayor Ed
Koch stated to Congress that a separate bill of rights was needed because
“‘an imbalance has evolved . . . while we have taken steps to insure the
rights of defendants and complainants, we have failed to protect the
127. See supra section II.A (discussing totality of circumstances test).
128. See Mark Porter, When the Cop Becomes the Suspect: A Primer on Garrity, 1
Mich. Crim. L. Ann. J. 33, 35 (2002) (noting right established in Garrity is explicitly tied to
“power of the paycheck”); see also Brandon L. Garrett, Corporate Confessions, 30
Cardozo L. Rev. 917, 920 (2008) (discussing situation where government “threatened
[corporation] with the corporate equivalent of capital punishment” and as a result,
corporation “took the only course open to it” and “exerted substantial pressure on its
employees to waive their constitutional rights” (quoting United States v. Stein, 440 F.
Supp. 2d 315, 319 (S.D.N.Y. 2006))).
129. Ironically, Garrity and its progeny have become the “bulwark” defense mechanism
for rank-and-ﬁle officers in “police labor relations” and in concert with later decisions, an
enormous thorn in the side of police prosecutions. See Porter, supra note 128, at 34–35
(noting irony of how Garrity has come to be used given how hostile police were to Warren
Court); see also Clymer, Compelled Statements, supra note 121, at 1338–41 (discussing
difficulty of obtaining useable evidence against police officers after Garrity and other
decisions).
130. See Keenan & Walker, supra note 76, at 196 (noting “dissatisfaction with internal
police management practices” as motivating factor for police unionization and enactment
of LEOBORs after efforts by police unions and “sympathetic public officials”).
131. Id.
132. See infra section IV.A (describing LEOBOR “cooling off” periods as potential
opportunity for police suspects to collude).
133. See Byron L. Warnken, The Law Enforcement Officers’ Privilege Against
Compelled Self-Incrimination, 16 U. Balt. L. Rev. 452, 488–89 (1987) (“Because the executive and judicial branches were still treating law enforcement officers as constitutionally
inferior, Congress, as well as some state legislatures, began to address the problem.”).
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rights of policemen.’”134 Introducing another bill the next year, an Illinois
congressman insisted that: “Law enforcement officers should be entitled
to the same protection of the laws they are required to enforce. Policemen should be as free of intimidation and harassment during the process
of a hearing as is the average citizen.”135 And yet another congressman
lamented that “[m]any Americans take [their constitutional] liberties
and rights for granted, but for . . . [the police] who have . . . experienced
life without them the saga reads very differently.”136 These statements
elucidate two important themes: First, LEOBOR proponents sincerely
believed police officers lacked adequate constitutional guarantees.
Second, these rights were negotiated with a focus on the rights police
suspects should have during criminal investigations, not merely internal
misconduct investigations.137
A federal LEOBOR has never been passed,138 but at least fourteen
state legislatures have passed such bills.139 Countless other versions are

134. Id. at 490 (quoting 118 Cong. Rec. H23,900 (daily ed. June 30, 1972) (statement
of Rep. Edward Koch)).
135. Id. at 491 (quoting 119 Cong. Rec. H2051 (daily ed. Jan. 23, 1972) (statement of
Rep. Frank Annunzio)).
136. Id. at 492 (quoting 122 Cong. Rec. H28,950 (daily ed. Sept. 2, 1976) (statement
of Rep. Martin Russo)).
137. One potentially legitimate critique of this Article’s comparison between
interrogations of police and interrogations of other suspects is that LEOBORs were
negotiated because the police are very often questioned about on-the-job infractions that
may or may not lead to criminal charges. In other words, LEOBORs are more about an
employer questioning an employee than an officer conducting a criminal interrogation.
While this may be, the statutes, for the most part, are not clear about whether interrogation protections apply to internal discipline only. See Keenan & Walker, supra note 76,
at 205 & n.125 (noting only three LEOBORs—Illinois, California, and Rhode Island—
officially do not apply when an investigation is criminal). Moreover, because in many
jurisdictions one investigation serves for both criminal charges and internal misconduct
charges, these protections apply, for the most part, to all officers suspected of criminal
wrongdoing, whether they are being questioned in formal or informal settings. See Hager,
supra note 5 (noting internal investigation is often sole investigation of misconduct).
Finally, regardless of this question, examining protections police want when they are
subjected to either criminal or internal questioning is a valuable tool for thinking about
potential reform. See infra section IV.A (using LEOBORs as model for broader confession
rights for all criminal defendants).
138. See Keenan & Walker, supra note 76, at 197 (noting since introduction of
LEOBOR bill in U.S. House of Representatives in 1970s, similar bills have been introduced
nearly every subsequent session and Congress came close to passing federal LEOBOR in
1991).
139. See id. (describing passage of LEOBORs in California, Florida, Illinois, Kentucky,
Louisiana, Maryland, Minnesota, Nevada, New Mexico, Rhode Island, Virginia, West
Virginia, and Wisconsin). Additionally, Arizona added a Peace Officer Bill of Rights in
2015. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 38-1102 (2015). Texas has had a state LEOBOR in place
for municipalities of over 1.5 million citizens. See Tex. Loc. Gov’t Code Ann. § 143.123
(West 2015).
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part of negotiated agreements with counties and municipalities.140 In the
only article to rigorously explore LEOBORs, Keenan and Professor
Walker provide a full account of the many and differing provisions contained in the state bills.141 This section will focus only on those provisions
that are germane to protections from police interrogation tactics. While
some LEOBORs specify that they apply only to internal investigations,142
most are silent on the interplay between administrative and criminal
investigations.143
Most statutory LEOBORs contain very similar language. This
includes the following rights for an officer being formally questioned:
1. The interrogation must be conducted at a reasonable hour,
preferably when the officer is on duty or during normal waking
hours.144
2. Prior to questioning, the officer is to be notiﬁed of whoever will
be present for the questioning and the nature of the charges.145
140. Because these are not statutes and because their content is very similar to their
statutory cousins, this Article will not focus on these agreements here.
141. Keenan & Walker, supra note 76.
142. See id. at 205–06 & n.125 (noting three LEOBORs—Illinois, California, and
Rhode Island—do not apply when investigation is criminal).
143. See id. at 205–06 (noting ten of fourteen LEOBOR statutes analyzed “are silent as
to whether they apply to suspected criminal behavior”).
144. See Cal. Gov’t Code § 3303(a) (West 2010) (requiring interrogation at reasonable
hour unless “seriousness of investigation requires otherwise”); Del. Code Ann. tit. 11,
§ 9200(c)(1) (2015) (requiring interrogation occur at reasonable hour unless “gravity of
investigation” makes “immediate questioning” necessary); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 112.532(1)(a)
(West 2014) (calling for interrogations at reasonable hour—preferably while officer is on
duty—unless immediate action is required); 50 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 725/3.3 (West 2006)
(“All interrogations shall be conducted at a reasonable time of day. Whenever the nature
of the alleged incident and operational requirements permit, interrogations shall be
conducted during the time when the officer is on duty.”); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 15.520(1)(c) (LexisNexis 2013) (prohibiting interrogation within forty-eight hours of
complaint and requiring interrogation take place while officer is on duty); Md. Code
Ann., Pub. Safety § 3-104(f) (LexisNexis 2011) (requiring interrogation to take place at
reasonable hour and if possible, while officer is on duty); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 626.89(7)
(West 2009) (“When practicable, sessions must be held during the officer’s regularly
scheduled work shift.”); Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 289.060(3) (LexisNexis 2013) (requiring
interrogation occur during officer’s regular shift or rescheduled shift or officer must
receive compensation if off duty); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 29-14-4(A) (2013) (“[A]ny interrogation of an officer shall be conducted when the officer is on duty or during his normal
working hours, unless the urgency of the investigation requires otherwise.”); 6C R.I. Gen.
Laws § 42-28-6-2(1) (2007) (“The interrogation shall be conducted at a reasonable hour,
preferably at a time when the law enforcement officer is on duty.”); Va. Code Ann. § 9.1501(1) (2012) (requiring questioning occur at reasonable time and place); W. Va. Code
Ann. § 8-14A-2(1) (LexisNexis 2012) (requiring interrogation occur while officer is on
duty if possible and that officer receive compensation if interrogation occurs while officer
is off duty).
145. See Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 9200(c)(3)–(4) (requiring officer receive notice of
officer in charge and nature of investigation); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 112.532(1)(c)–(d) (same);
50 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 725/3.2, 725/3.4 (same); La. Stat. Ann. § 40:2531(B)(1) (2014)
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The officer can be questioned only by one (sometimes two)
person(s) during an interrogation session.146
The interrogation must be for a reasonable period.147
The officer under interrogation must be allowed to attend to
personal physical necessities.148

(requiring notice of nature of investigation and interrogators at beginning of interrogation); Md. Code Ann., Pub. Safety § 3-104(d)(1)–(2) (same); Minn. Stat. Ann.
§ 626.89(5)–(6) (requiring officer receive copy of signed complaint and allowing officer to
require list of witnesses); Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 289.060(2) (listing notice requirements);
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 29-14-4(C)–(D) (same); 6C R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-28.6-2(3), (5) (same): Va.
Code Ann. § 9.1-501(2) (same); W. Va. Code Ann. § 8-14A-2(2) (same). Compare Cal.
Gov’t Code § 3303(b)–(c) (requiring officer be informed of officer in charge of
investigation and nature of investigation), and Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 15.520(1)(e)
(declaring officer is entitled to know nature of charges against him if they are based on
violation of local unit of government rule or regulation), with Wis. Stat. Ann.
§ 164.02(1)(a) (West 2006) (requiring only that officer be informed of nature of
investigation).
146. See Cal. Gov’t Code § 3303(b) (“All questions . . . shall be asked by and through
no more than two interrogators at one time.”); Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 9200(c)(3) (“All
questions . . . shall be asked by and through no more than 2 investigators.”); Fla. Stat. Ann.
§ 112.532(1)(c) (stating questions must be asked by one investigator unless officer waives
requirement); Md. Code Ann., Pub. Safety § 3-104(h)(1) (“All questions . . . shall be asked
by and through one interrogating officer . . . .”); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 29-14-4(D)(4)
(“[T]here shall not be more than two interrogators at any given time . . . .”); 6C R.I. Gen.
Laws § 42-28.6-2(3) (“All questions directed to the officer under interrogation shall be
asked by and through one interrogator.”). But see W. Va. Code Ann. § 8-14A-2(2)
(prohibiting use of more than three interrogators at once).
147. See Cal. Gov’t Code § 3303(d) (requiring interrogation occur in “reasonable
period” taking “into consideration gravity and complexity of issues”); Del. Code Ann. tit.
11, § 9200(c)(5) (“Interview sessions shall be for reasonable periods of time.”); Fla. Stat.
Ann. § 112.532(1)(e) (requiring interrogation “be conducted at a reasonable hour”); 50
Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 725/3.5 (“Interrogation sessions shall be of reasonable duration and
shall permit the officer interrogated reasonable periods for rest and personal
necessities.”); La. Stat. Ann. § 40:2531(B)(2) (requiring any interrogation “be for a
reasonable period of time”); Md. Code Ann., Pub. Safety § 3-104(h)(2)(i) (“Each session
of interrogation shall be for a reasonable period of time.”); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 626.89(7)
(“Sessions at which a formal statement is taken must be of reasonable duration . . . .”);
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 29-14-4(D)(1)–(3) (stating each session will last no more than two
hours).
148. See Cal. Gov’t Code § 3303(d) (“The person under interrogation shall be allowed
to attend to his or her own personal physical necessities.”); Del. Code Ann. tit. 11,
§ 9200(c)(5) (requiring police suspect be granted time for “personal necessities and rest
periods”); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 112.532(1)(e) (same); 50 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 725/3.5
(requiring interrogations provide reasonable time for personal necessities); La. Stat. Ann.
§ 40:2531(B)(2) (requiring interrogation “allow for reasonable periods for the rest and
personal necessities” of officer); Md. Code Ann., Pub. Safety § 3-104(h)(2)(ii) (requiring
interrogation “allow for personal necessities and rest periods”); Minn. Stat. Ann.
§ 626.89(7) (requiring interrogators “must give the officer reasonable periods for rest and
personal necessities.”); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 29-14-4(D)(1)–(3) (establishing time limitations
and requiring “rest periods”); 6C R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-28.6-2(6) (“Interrogating sessions
shall be for reasonable periods and shall be timed to allow for such personal necessities
and rest periods as are reasonably necessary.”).
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6.
7.

The officer must not be subject to any abusive language.149
No promise of reward can be made as an inducement to answering any question.150
8. The officer may not be compelled to submit to a lie detector
test, nor may any comment on her refusal be entered into the
notes of the investigation.151
9. The officer must not be threatened with punitive action (other
than the threat that not answering questions may result in such
action) or inducements.152
Taking LEOBOR protections and the Garrity holding in the
aggregate, a quite civil investigative picture emerges. The suspected
officer is aware of the potential charges against her and is questioned at a
time when she is most alert, with time limitations, taking into account
her personal needs, and by only one investigator, who may not use abusive language, threats, or promises to encourage her to confess. Should a
149. See 50 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 725/3.6 (“The officer being interrogated shall not be
subjected to professional or personal abuse, including offensive language.”); N.M. Stat.
Ann. § 29-14-4(D)(6) (“[A]n officer shall not be subjected to offensive language . . . .”); W.
Va. Code Ann. § 8-14A-2(3) (prohibiting interrogating officers from using “offensive
language” or threats of punitive action).
150. See Cal. Gov’t Code § 3303(e) (“No promise of a reward shall be made . . . .”);
Fla. Stat. Ann. § 112.532(1)(f) (“A promise or reward may not be made as an inducement
to answer any questions.”); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 29-14-4(D)(6) (stating questioned officer
shall not be subjected to illegal “coercion”); W. Va. Code Ann. § 8-14A-2(3) (“No promise
of reward shall be made as an inducement to answering questions.”).
151. See Cal. Gov’t Code § 3307 (“No public safety officer shall be compelled to
submit to a lie detector test against his or her own will.”); 50 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 725/3.11
(“In the course of any interrogation no officer shall be required to submit to a polygraph
test, or any other test questioning by means of any chemical substance, except with the
officer’s express written consent.”); Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 289.050, 289.070(1)
(LexisNexis 2013) (prohibiting disciplinary or retaliatory action against officer for refusal
to submit to polygraphic examination). But see Md. Code Ann., Pub. Safety § 3-104(l)(1)
(stating agency may compel officer to submit to polygraph exam).
152. See Cal. Gov’t Code § 3303(e) (stating officers cannot be threatened with
punitive action but can be informed of possible punitive action if they do not respond to
directly relevant questions); Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 9200(c)(6) (“[N]o officer shall be
threatened with transfer, dismissal or other disciplinary action.”); Fla. Stat. Ann.
§ 112.532(1)(f) (prohibiting inducements); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 15.520(1)(b) (LexisNexis
2013) (prohibiting threats, promises, or coercion when officer is suspect in criminal
prosecution or accused of violating law enforcement procedures and stating suspension
without pay and reassignment are not coercion); Md. Code Ann., Pub. Safety § 3-104(i)
(stating officer cannot be “threatened with transfer, dismissal, or disciplinary action”);
Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 289.060(4) (stating officer responses to questions under threat of
punitive action are inadmissible in subsequent proceedings); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 29-144(D)(6) (stating officer may not be subject to illegal “coercion”); 6C R.I. Gen. Laws § 4228.6-2(7) (“Any law enforcement officer under interrogation shall not be threatened with
transfer, dismissal, or disciplinary action.”); W. Va. Code Ann. § 8-14A-2(3) (prohibiting
threats of “punitive action” and “promise[s] of rewards”).
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police suspect be compelled to make a statement by threat of dismissal,
her statement is inadmissible at any criminal trial.
Depending on one’s view of the value of confessions, the meaning of
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, and the correct balance to strike
between fairness and truth seeking, this may be an ideal or an overprotective and inefficient set of rights.153 Regardless, it is a set of rights that,
for all intents and purposes, applies only to police officers.
III. THE SYSTEMIC PERILS CREATED BY ADDITIONAL INTERROGATION
PROTECTIONS FOR POLICE
LEOBORs that grant protections for law enforcement suspects are
systemically harmful in at least three ways. First, they problematically
distribute criminal procedures unequally to sophisticated suspects.
Second, they threaten the legitimacy of the criminal justice system by
showing that the police do not allow the interrogation tactics that police
use on ordinary suspects—some of which contribute to false confessions—to be used when they are suspects. Third, they violate a number of
values that, according to procedural-justice scholars, lead to cooperation
with the criminal law. The unequal distribution of criminal procedure
protections to police is an untenable state.
On the one hand, police suspects beneﬁt from a host of speciﬁc,
statutorily imposed positive protections against interrogation. Meanwhile
other potential criminal suspects have only the right to be notiﬁed of
their constitutional protections and to argue that their confession was
the product of interrogation so coercive that it overbore their will to
remain silent.154 What is wrong with this picture? At ﬁrst blush, there is
the problem that this state of affairs gives signiﬁcantly more formal
protection to one group of criminal suspects than to others. This alone
violates our core notion of equality under law, which is the subject of
much criminal justice writing in other contexts.155
There is also something particularly problematic with the fact that
the privileged group of suspects here is the police. This problem takes a
number of forms. If constitutional protections already invert the
relationship between sophisticated suspects and the protections they
receive, granting additional affirmative rights for police skews the system
even further in this direction. Additional rights for arguably the most
sophisticated suspects threaten the legitimacy of the criminal justice
153. See, e.g., Cassell, Protecting the Innocent, supra note 92, at 498 (arguing there is
“lost confession problem” across criminal justice system that “arises because restrictions on
interrogations can reduce the number of confessions police obtain, which will in turn
prevent police from solving crimes”).
154. See supra section II.A (discussing how current constitutional protections of
confessions favor sophisticated suspects).
155. See supra note 62 and accompanying text (identifying recent scholarship
focusing on equality and justice in criminal system).
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system by preferencing, or at the very least appearing to preference,
insiders over outsiders. Relatedly, suggesting that the criminal justice
system is inherently biased in favor of those insiders charged with
enforcing the law dilutes the normative legitimacy of the criminal law
and the incentives ordinary citizens have to follow it. These are serious
systemic harms that threaten our already problematic criminal justice
system.156
A.

Fairness, Legitimacy, and the Appearance of Justice

The fact that the most sophisticated suspects get a special layer of
protection from interrogation threatens the legitimacy of the criminal
justice system. It allows for the inhumane treatment of some suspects
while shielding the police from the same tactics. In addition, it violates
the central principle of due process that “justice appear just.” By doing
so, it further sullies the legitimacy of the criminal justice system.157
Because investigations, and particularly those aimed at police, are
shrouded in so much secrecy, those on the outside do not see whether
police are actually granted these extra protections in every criminal
investigation or how these additional layers of protection place police in
a privileged position. What the public does tend to see, and what has
been the subject of much media focus, is police using excessive force and
in a number of cases, not being subjected to prosecution or punishment
despite using such force.158
Indeed, LEOBORs have come under ﬁre for just this reason in
places where police have been accused of killing unarmed civilians.159
156. Many scholars have exposed the criminal justice system’s disparate impact on:
minorities, see Alexander, supra note 25, at 96–97 (arguing mass incarceration through
War on Drugs disparately and unfairly impacts African Americans and Latinos); the poor,
see Paul D. Butler, Poor People Lose: Gideon and the Critique of Rights, 122 Yale L.J. 2176,
2185–87 (2013) (noting poor typically do not receive particularly able defense counsel);
Jeffrey Fagan & Tracey L. Meares, Punishment, Deterrence and Social Control: The
Paradox of Punishment in Minority Communities, 6 Ohio St. J. Crim. L. 173, 226 (2008)
(highlighting legal control of poor through mass incarceration); and other marginalized
groups, see William J. Rich, The Path of Mentally Ill Offenders, 36 Fordham Urb. L.J. 89,
90 (2009) (concluding mentally ill are more likely to be imprisoned and go untreated).
157. See Levine, Who Shouldn’t Prosecute, supra note 3 (manuscript at 9–10)
(discussing appearance-of-justice principle as applicable to prosecutors).
158. The problem this Article alludes to is exempliﬁed by the nonindictment of the
officer who choked Eric Garner to death, the lack of charges in the shooting of twelveyear-old Tamir Rice, and the acquittal of Chicago Officer Brelo, who shot two unarmed
people in a car. Recently, several counterexamples have arisen, including the prosecution
and conviction of Officer Liang for the shooting death of Akai Gurley in Brooklyn, New
York, the very public charging and indictment of six officers in the death of Freddie Gray,
and the indictment of Officer Slager for shooting Walter Scott in the back as he ran away.
Whether or not these cases represent a trend toward more criminal prosecutions and
convictions of police remains to be seen.
159. See infra section IV.A (summarizing recent arguments in favor of abolishing
LEOBORs).
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These reactions to LEOBORs mirror the more general public sentiment
that unpunished police criminality is a threat to the legitimacy of our
system.160 Beyond the fact that these specialized protections for the most
sophisticated suspects are unfair, the shroud under which they are meted
out to criminal justice insiders offends an important due process principle in our criminal justice system.161 This is the principle that justice
must satisfy the appearance of justice. The Supreme Court has used this
principle to disqualify judges in several cases where they appeared
biased, regardless of proof that they were.162
The “appearance of justice” principle does not formally apply to
many of the settings this Article discusses because so little of criminal
justice actually happens in these settings. But because police and
prosecutors are, for many suspects, the face of criminal justice,163 it is
these actors who are most responsible for whether the public views the
system as fairly distributed or as corrupt and unjust.164 This is part of a
much larger problem in our current system: Those we entrust to enforce
our laws enjoy almost unchecked discretion and are too often not
required to explain the seemingly unfair decisions they make.165
This point is at the very core of the problem with LEOBORs and
Garrity rights for police. In the judicial context, prominent scholars have
noted that “if there exists any reasonable doubt about the adjudicator’s
impartiality at the outset of a case, provision of the most elaborate pro-

160. See, e.g., Paul Butler, Opinion, The Police Officers’ Bill of Rights Creates a
Double Standard, N.Y. Times (June 27, 2015, 9:13 PM), http://www.nytimes.com/
roomfordebate/2015/04/29/baltimore-and-bolstering-a-police-officers-right-to-remainsilent/the-police-officers-bill-of-rights-creates-a-double-standard (on ﬁle with the Columbia
Law Review) (describing alleged preferential treatment of officers in Freddie Gray case as
“thwart[ing] transparency and accountability”).
161. See Levine, Who Shouldn’t Prosecute, supra note 3 (manuscript at 9–10)
(discussing “appearance of justice” principle as it has been applied).
162. See id. (manuscript at 10–12) (“The Supreme Court has made clear that, even in
cases where a judge is accused of an actual conﬂict, the appearance of bias is of utmost
concern.”).
163. See supra Part I (describing how most suspects come into contact with police and
prosecutors far more often than with other actors in our system of guilty pleas).
164. See Levine, Who Shouldn’t Prosecute, supra note 3 (manuscript at 34–35, 39)
(arguing relationship between prosecutors and police officers negatively colors public
perception of fairness of prosecutions of police officers); Natapoff, supra note 38, at 1361–
62 (discussing procedural legitimacy problems with police and prosecutorial selection
decisions); Woods, supra note 47, at 757–58 (“Improving perceptions of police legitimacy
is not only important on its own terms but can have important long-term beneﬁts for
compliance with the law.”). While our awareness of LEOBORs is recent, their existence
has already drawn criticism from scholars, politicians, and the public. See infra section
IV.A (discussing these reactions).
165. See Angela J. Davis, Arbitrary Justice: The Power of the American Prosecutor 40,
166 (2007) (noting prosecutors are unaccountable to public and do not force police to be
accountable by scrutinizing their investigations).
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cedural safeguards will not avail to create this appearance of justice.”166
In the case of the police policing themselves, however, the opposite
statement could be made. If the police alone are given “the most
elaborate procedural safeguards,” no amount of “impartiality” of judges
or other public officials will “create the appearance of justice.”167
In order for the criminal justice system to maintain its legitimacy in
the eyes of those who do not operate within its borders daily, it cannot
appear to favor insiders over outsiders. And there is almost no way to
appear more corrupt and unjust than having a specialized set of protections that regulate the police from interrogating other officers while
they are free to use almost any tactic, short of physical abuse or extreme
deprivation, against all other suspects.168
Adding to the legitimacy problem created by the actual and
apparent special treatment of police suspects is a problem speciﬁc to
interrogations: our growing awareness of how many innocent people
have been imprisoned after making false confessions. In 2008, Professor
Brandon Garrett conducted a study of exonerees in which he found that
“[a]t the trial court level, four types of evidence often supported these
200 erroneous convictions: eyewitness identiﬁcation evidence, forensic
evidence, informant testimony, and confessions.”169 Confessions accounted for sixteen percent of the wrongly convicted in his study and
“while half of those who falsely confessed raised claims challenging the
confession, none received relief.”170
More recently, Professor Garrett examined several more exonerees’
cases, ﬁnding numerous false confessors who could have been exonerated by DNA evidence at the time of their confessions.171 Of the twentysix new confession cases he studied, ten involved juveniles, at least two
more involved those who had an “intellectual disability,” and at least one
involved a suspect who was “mentally ill.”172 All twenty-six suspects waived
their Miranda rights. Professor Garrett found that all but one confession
were the product of “lengthy interrogations.”173 One man was questioned
for twenty-seven hours, another for twelve, and all but one for more than
166. Martin H. Redish & Lawrence C. Marshall, Adjudicatory Independence and the
Values of Procedural Due Process, 95 Yale L.J. 455, 483–84 (1986).
167. Id.
168. See supra Part II (describing formal protections for police suspects during
interrogations).
169. See Garrett, Judging Innocence, supra note 77, at 122.
170. Id. at 61.
171. See Brandon L. Garrett, Contaminated Confessions Revisited, 101 Va. L. Rev. 395,
396 (2015) [hereinafter Garrett, Contaminated Confessions] (“Other convictions were
more recent and are troubling for a different reason: Nearly half of these false confession
cases involved convictions despite DNA tests that excluded the defendants at the time of
conviction.”).
172. Id. at 399–400.
173. Id.
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three hours. Judges affirmed the voluntariness of the confessions in every
one of these cases.174 Three of these exonerees had been sentenced to
death.175 Professor Garrett concluded that an even greater number of
false confessions likely exist but have not come to light due to the lack of
scientiﬁc evidence in these cases.176 As discussed above, other studies
have shown that particularly vulnerable populations, including children,
the mentally disadvantaged, and the mentally ill, are far more likely to
confess; unsurprisingly, these groups are also more likely to be among
those later exonerated.177
Despite this mounting evidence about false confessions,178 and about
how isolation, lengthy interrogations, inducements, threats and other
police tactics prevented by LEOBORs contribute to the conviction of
innocent defendants,179 police continue to interrogate suspects with
almost no regulation.180 And prosecutors continue to use confessions,
ruled voluntary, to secure plea bargains or convince juries of a defendant’s guilt. In fact, when confessions are available as evidence, police
and prosecutors often do little to no further investigation, as they are
certain that a confessor is guilty or that they can convince a jury of a
defendant’s guilt.181
Now we come to ﬁnd that the police themselves have negotiated for
affirmative protections when they are the subjects of investigation, precisely because they are aware of how these tactics can force confessions.182
As inequitable as these special protections may seem in hindsight, they
were not lobbied for in a cynical manner. Indeed, they arose out of a
sincere concern that internal-affairs investigators would coerce police

174. Id. at 402.
175. Id. at 400.
176. See id. at 396 (“This second wave of false confessions should cause even greater
alarm than the ﬁrst.”).
177. See supra notes 111–112 and accompanying text (describing particular
susceptibility of certain vulnerable classes of suspects to making false confessions).
178. See Garrett, Judging Innocence, supra note 77, at 88–91 (giving evidence of false
confessions in criminal convictions); see also Drizin & Leo, supra note 110, at 932–95
(discussing quantitative and qualitative trends in false confessions and case outcomes).
179. See Drizin & Leo, supra note 110, at 907–23, 948 (reviewing common
interrogation strategies leading to false confessions, including lengthy interrogation,
isolation, inducements, threats, and other psychological tactics).
180. See Stuntz, Mistake, supra note 104, at 977 (arguing Miranda left “police tactics
unregulated”).
181. See Richard A. Leo & Richard J. Ofshe, The Consequences of False Confessions:
Deprivations of Liberty and Miscarriages of Justice in the Age of Psychological
Interrogation, 88 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 429, 440–41 (1998) (“Once a confession is
obtained, investigation often ceases, and convicting the defendant becomes the only goal
of both investigators and prosecutors.”).
182. See supra section II.B (describing role of police unions in negotiating affirmative
protections against coercive investigation).
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officers into speaking against their will.183 They also represent the basic
humane treatment that police officers expect to receive when they are
being investigated. The fact that such rights were won sincerely does not
lessen the legitimacy problem LEOBORs create. Officers who know what
protections they need from each other continue to deny such protections
to other criminal suspects. Meanwhile, judges and prosecutors, who
should be aware of which techniques coerce confessions, continue to
encourage these tactics. They do so by ruling the vast majority of confessions voluntary and using confessions as powerful bargaining and trial
chips.184 Thus, the formal protections that shield police from one
another contribute to the appearance of an illegitimate criminal justice
system.
B.

Procedural Justice and Obeying the Law

The appearance problem created by specialized protections for
police may do more than just cause citizen distrust in the system. It may
also create an incentive for people to ignore the law.
The criminal law’s purpose is not simply to deter criminal activity
but to impart expressive messages about what our democratic society
perceives as moral.185 In order for criminal law to encourage compliance
for any reason other than the fear of punishment, those entrusted to
enforce it must be seen as motivated by unbiased and just purposes.186
Indeed, Professor Tyler writes, “[P]eople do not judge the fairness of
legal procedures by the degree to which they gained or lost from those
procedures . . . the primary direct inﬂuence upon . . . judgments of . . .
legitimacy comes from judgments about the trustworthiness of authori183. See supra section II.B (describing protection from “economic duress inherent in
a choice between incriminating themselves and losing their jobs”).
184. See Brandon L. Garrett, The Substance of False Confessions, 62 Stan. L. Rev.
1051, 1118 (2010) [hereinafter Garrett, Substance] (noting, in study of forty exonerees
who confessed, “DNA testing excluded eight of these exonerees at the time of trial, but
the confession of guilt was powerful enough to overcome the DNA evidence of
innocence”); Eugene R. Milhizer, Confessions After Connelly: An Evidentiary Solution for
Excluding Unreliable Confessions, 81 Temp. L. Rev. 1, 4 (2008) (“Confessions are
uniquely powerful evidence of guilt at a criminal trial.”).
185. See Lisa Kern Griffin, Criminal Lying, Prosecutorial Power, and Social Meaning,
97 Calif. L. Rev. 1515, 1549 (2009) (“Although morality is but one source of the criminal
law’s credibility, it functions best when it imposes requirements perceived as just and
punishes those deemed deserving.”); see also David Michael Jaros, Perfecting Criminal
Markets, 112 Colum. L. Rev. 1947, 1987 (2012) (“[T]he law does not simply extract a price
for undesirable conduct; it also regulates the social meaning of such activity.”); Dan M.
Kahan, The Secret Ambition of Deterrence, 113 Harv. L. Rev. 413, 435 (1999) (arguing
deterrence discourse masks expressive function of criminal law and providing examples of
morality-based criminal law and punishment).
186. See Tom R. Tyler & Yuen J. Huo, Trust in the Law 14–15 (2002) (“[D]eference
develops . . . when people are treated fairly by legal authorities, and people’s willingness to
consent and cooperate with legal authorities is rooted in their judgments about the degree
to which those authorities are using fair procedures.”).
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ties.”187 Trust in legal authorities comes from a belief in the “benevolence
of motives and intentions of the person with whom one is dealing.”188
The belief that authorities have “benevolent” motives encourages deference to the criminal law.189 If this is true, the converse is also likely to be
true: Citizen deference to the law is discouraged when the public believes
that legal authorities have malevolent or biased motives.
Our criminal justice system is rife with reasons to distrust authorities’
motives.190 Specialized affirmative procedures for police suspects is a
particularly pernicious example because it goes to the very heart of what
studies have shown lead people to lose faith in the system. LEOBORs are
procedures, designed by police for police, that ﬂy in the face of the very
techniques that police, prosecutors, and judges uphold as necessary
interrogation techniques for civilians.
On the one hand, confessions are touted as among the most
important forms of evidence—one of the best ways to ensure that guilty
defendants are punished.191 On the other hand, we see police shielding
themselves from these very techniques, with little or no comment from
other system actors. The fact that there are many LEOBORs that are
statutory protections suggests that the legislature, entrusted with drafting
the criminal law, has acceded to protecting police suspects over other
citizens.192 What trust then can we expect civilians to have in those who
write the law, let alone those who enforce it, when a different set of rules
has been explicitly laid out for the police?
Police unions continue to argue that LEOBORs are necessary for the
police but not others,193 but this claim has little validity. As has been dis187. Tom R. Tyler, The Psychology of Public Dissatisfaction with Government, in What
Is It About Government that Americans Dislike? 227, 238 (John R. Hibbing & Elizabeth
Theiss-Morse eds., 2001).
188. Id.
189. See id. (deﬁning motive-based trust as “trust in the benevolence of the motives
and intentions of the person with whom one is dealing”).
190. See, e.g., Stephanie Chin, Pennsylvania Rocked by ‘Jailing Kids for Cash’ Scandal,
CNN (Feb. 24, 2009, 10:15 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2009/CRIME/02/23/
pennsylvania.corrupt.judges [http://perma.cc/9VYR-TTD9] (reporting several judges
accused of sending children to private prisons in return for kickbacks); Dahlia Litwick,
You’re All Out, Slate (May 28, 2015, 1:38 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_
politics/jurisprudence/2015/05/orange_county_prosecutor_misconduct_judge_goethal
_takes_district_attorney.html [http://perma.cc/8SEK-GGSU] (discussing “entrenched
and systemic” prosecutorial misconduct in Orange County, California).
191. See White, Involuntary Confession, supra note 94, at 2037–38 (“[A]ccurate
confessions are of great value to society. When . . . little forensic evidence is available and
pressure to solve the crime is high, a true confession will be . . . the only means of solving
the crime . . . .”).
192. See supra section II.B (showing how LEOBORs skew constitutional justice in
favor of police defendants).
193. See Chuck Canterbury, Opinion, Greater Scrutiny Makes Officer Vulnerable to
False Charges, N.Y. Times: Room for Debate (Apr. 29, 2015, 6:46 AM), http://www.nytimes.
com/roomfordebate/2015/04/29/baltimore-and-bolstering-a-police-officers-right-to-
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cussed, police are already among the most privileged suspects, stemming
from their position as criminal justice insiders. Moreover, they receive
more protection from the substantive criminal law than other suspects, at
least when they are accused of brutality. For instance, unlike regular
citizens, police have no duty to retreat should they ﬁnd themselves in
harm’s way.194 It makes some sense for the police to be treated differently
in kind by the substantive law—they put themselves in harm’s way for the
protection of society.195 In order to ensure that they have incentives to
continue to take such risks, society may prefer to afford them a better
affirmative defense when they are suspected of an assault or homicide.196
But criminal procedure should not be distributed differently to different
classes of offenders, and it certainly should not be enshrined in formal
law.197 To the extent that one disagrees with this characterization of
procedure, as far as interrogations are concerned, police may deserve less
procedural protection. Police know interrogation techniques better than
anyone else. They are therefore least likely to be tricked, scared, or
abused into confessing.198 This Article does not argue that police should
be afforded less procedural protection in interrogations, but there is no
cogent, principled reason why police should have more procedural
protection than ordinary citizens.
IV. THE REFORMATIVE PROMISE OF EXTENDING SOME LEOBOR
PROTECTIONS TO ALL CRIMINAL SUSPECTS
Two opposite conclusions could follow from the above analysis of
formal procedural favoritism in interrogations for police suspects. The
ﬁrst is that such rights are overprotective of police suspects and contribute to the ongoing problem facing law enforcement accountability: that
remain-silent/greater-scrutiny-makes-officer-vulnerable-to-false-charges (on ﬁle with the
Columbia Law Review) (highlighting argument from national president of Fraternal Order
of Police that law enforcement officers need extra administrative due process rights
because of nature of job).
194. See John L. Watts, Tyranny by Proxy: State Action and the Private Use of Deadly
Force, 89 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1237, 1238 (2014) (noting while about half of states allow
private citizens to claim self-defense without duty to retreat, “all states permit the police to
use deadly force in self-defense without imposing a duty to retreat”).
195. See Harmon, supra note 10, at 792 (“Regulation of the police should promote
harm-efficient policing—that is, policing that imposes harms only when, all things
considered, the beneﬁts for law, order, fear reduction, and officer safety outweigh the costs
of those harms.”).
196. Cf. L. Song Richardson & Phillip Atiba Goff, Self-Defense and the Suspicion
Heuristic, 98 Iowa L. Rev. 293, 332 (2012) (noting possibility of police training as another
argument against imposing duty to retreat on police officers).
197. See, e.g., Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956) (“There can be no equal justice
where the kind of trial a man gets depends on the amount of money he has. Destitute
defendants must be afforded as adequate appellate review as defendants who have money
enough to buy transcripts.”).
198. See supra section II.B (discussing advantages police officers have when they are
suspects and defendants).
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police officers should be treated more like the rest of society. Another
conclusion, and the one this Article comes to, is that certain provisions of
LEOBORs are common-sense protections. They serve the important
goals of making potentially false confessions less likely and upholding a
basic standard of behavior for public officials toward those suspected, but
not yet charged or convicted, of crimes.199
This Part addresses how best to solve the problem of special
interrogatory protections for police. First, it considers the suggestion that
scholars, commentators, and politicians have made—that we abolish
LEOBORs to ensure police accountability and equal procedures for
criminal suspects. Certain ancillary features of LEOBORs, in particular
the long waiting periods before questioning, should be abolished.200 But
the core of LEOBORs—the affirmative protections from certain coercive
interrogation tactics—should instead be extended to all suspects.
Returning to the notion of police as criminal justice insiders, the
protections the police negotiate for in the interrogation context are
theoretically and practically among the best tools available for mapping
out a more accurate and more humane way to conduct interrogations.
LEOBORs are the protections selected by those with the most knowledge
about interrogations when they imagine themselves to be in the position
of criminal suspects. As such, these documents are an almost uniquely
suited model for beginning to reimagine what the law should look like.
The next section discusses which LEOBOR provisions should be
extended to all suspects. It concedes that, because LEOBORs may
represent overprotection rather than optimal interrogation procedures,
a protection’s existence in a LEOBOR is not, on its own, a sufficient
condition for extension. It then suggests two categories of LEOBOR
provisions that have independent value, either because they may impact
the likelihood of a false confession or because they represent a ﬂoor of
humane treatment under which state officials should not be allowed to
fall.
The last section suggests two ways in which LEOBORs may be used
to change the law on interrogations. First, state legislatures could pass
statutes similar to LEOBORs that give all criminal suspects some of the
same affirmative interrogation rights currently reserved for police. It
199. See, e.g., Drizin & Leo, supra note 110, at 910–12 (noting widespread lack of
public awareness of existence of “interrogation-induced false confessions” and extent to
which police training encourages and trains police to conduct such confessions); Leo &
Ofshe, supra note 181, at 440–41 (“Interrogators sometimes become so committed to
closing a case that they improperly use psychological interrogation techniques to coerce or
persuade a suspect into giving a statement that allows the interrogator to make an
arrest.”).
200. See generally Aziz Z. Huq & Richard H. McAdams, Litigating the Blue Wall of
Silence: How to Challenge the Police Privilege to Delay Investigation (Univ. Chi. Legal
Forum, Pub. Law Working Paper No. 555, 2016), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2712967 (on
ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) (discussing problems with delay periods and suggesting
ways to challenge them).
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sketches out roughly what such a statute could look like. Second, both
trial and appellate judges should be aware of and consider LEOBORs as
a model to determine whether a confession was voluntary when conducting a totality of the circumstances analysis. The Article next proceeds
by discussing some positive systemic possibilities that ﬂow from extending
LEOBOR interrogation protection to all suspects and addresses some
possible counterarguments.
A.

Using LEOBORs as a Starting Point for Reimagining Confession Rights

Most scholars who have commented on LEOBORs have criticized
them. Such a response, while intuitively appealing, misses an important
opportunity for real and sustained interrogation reform.
Very few scholars or commentators have addressed LEOBORs. In
the wake of certain well-publicized police killings, however, particularly
the spine-breaking death of Freddie Gray on a “rough ride” in a
Baltimore police van, politicians and scholars have begun to take note.
With the exception of police union representatives,201 the response
almost uniformly has been to call for the abolition of LEOBORs.202 But
for the most part, attention has been on a provision of these statutes that
is not about interrogation. Many LEOBORs contain a waiting period before an officer may be questioned.203 The purpose of this waiting period
is ostensibly to provide time for an officer to ﬁnd an attorney.204 Given
that police have well-connected union representatives who can easily and
quickly secure them representation,205 however, these waiting periods
offer the opportunity for officers to collude and present an innocent
version of events in a case in which their actions may not have been
justiﬁed.206
201. See Canterbury, supra note 193 (claiming LEOBORs “simply reaffirm the existence of . . . rights in the unique context of the law enforcement community”).
202. See Hager, supra note 5 (identifying public officials and experts, including
Baltimore Mayor Rawlings-Blake, who spoke out against LEOBORs); Olson, supra note 3
(detailing efforts of Mayor Rawlings-Blake, ACLU, and state legislators to roll back
Maryland LEOBOR).
203. See, e.g., Md. Code Ann., Pub. Safety § 3-104(j)(2)(i) (LexisNexis 2011) (providing ten-day waiting period to allow suspect to obtain representation).
204. See id. § 3-104(j)(1)(i) (“On request, the law enforcement officer under
interrogation has the right to be represented by counsel or another responsible representative of the law enforcement officer’s choice who shall be present and available for
consultation at all times during the interrogation.”).
205. Many were horriﬁed to learn that the police officer who shot Akai Gurley in a
Brooklyn stairwell immediately texted his union representative, rather than attempting to
help the unarmed man he had just shot. See Andy Cush, NYPD Cop Who Killed Gurley
Texted Union Instead of Seeking Help: Report, Gawker (Dec. 5, 2014, 9:35 AM),
http://gawker.com/nypd-cop-who-killed-gurley-texted-union-instead-of-seek-1667183543
[http://perma.cc/W4UK-FA22] (describing responses in aftermath of police shooting).
206. See Keenan & Walker, supra note 76, at 212 (“Delays in the investigation of
possible officer misconduct are intolerable. There is a widespread impression that delays
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In Baltimore, this “cooling-off period” is ten days, an all but
unjustiﬁable length of time.207 The Baltimore mayor, citing this delay,
criticized LEOBORs for making the investigation into the officers involved in Gray’s death more difficult.208 Other politicians and advocacy
organizations have called for the repeal or abrogation of LEOBORs. The
mayor of Providence, Rhode Island, has called for the elimination of his
state’s statute.209 A California chapter of the AFL-CIO has publicly asked
the national federation of unions to cut ties with police unions, citing
unfairness of LEOBOR protections as a major reason for the split.210
Scholars who have responded to the role of LEOBORs in police
brutality cases are similarly critical of the statutes. Professor Paul Butler
asserts that the officers in the Gray case had ten days “before they ha[d]
to say a mumbling word.”211 He went further, stating that “the police will
take advantage of all the extra due process they get . . . to concoct an
alternative version of events.”212 He also argued that LEOBORs are laws
that “thwart transparency and accountability.”213 His recommendation,
unsurprisingly, was to abolish them.214 Professors Walker and Jeffrey
Fagan and well-known innocence lawyer Peter Neufeld have also commented that LEOBORs are unfair extra protections that impede “police
accountability.”215
in investigations allow officers time to collude to create a consistent, exculpatory story.”);
Butler, supra note 160 (“It is far from a fanciful concern that the police will take advantage
of all the extra due process they get under . . . law to concoct an alternative version of
events.”).
207. See Hager, supra note 5 (“Maryland’s LEOBoR includes a provision that the
officers cannot be forced to make any statements for 10 days after the incident, during
which time they are presumed to be searching for a lawyer.”). The Maryland legislature is
poised to consider a bill that, among other reforms, will reduce the LEOBOR waiting
period from ten to ﬁve days. Erin Cox, Maryland Task Force Recommends 22 Police
Reforms, Balt. Sun (Jan. 11, 2016), http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/
politics/bs-md-policing-group-20160111-story.html [http://perma.cc/D7Q4-CXPB]. The
Maryland police union has stated that it opposes all suggested reforms. Id.
208. Hager, supra note 5.
209. Ethan Shorey, Union President Slams Mayor for Comments on Williams, Process,
Valley Breeze (Mar. 3, 2015), http://www.valleybreeze.com/2015-03-03/north-providence/
union-president-slams-mayor-comments-williams-process#.VdDXZflVhHw [http://perma.
cc/48TE-AHKE].
210. United Auto Workers Local 2865, UAW Local Calls on AFL-CIO to End Ties to
Police Unions, New Politics (July 27, 2015), http://newpol.org/content/uaw-local-calls-aﬂcio-end-ties-police-unions [http://perma.cc/R4QQ-B8FN] (arguing LEOBORs “aim[] to
protect the rights of officers above the needs of the community”).
211. Butler, supra note 160.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. See id. (“In a democracy an accused ‘thug’ should not get more rights just
because he wears a badge and a gun.”).
215. Hager, supra note 5 (noting agreement among Professor Walker, Professor Fagan,
and Neufeld that LEOBORs have negative inﬂuence on police accountability). In the
same article, however, Professor Steve Drizin, an expert on suspect rights, suggested taking
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It is not hard to understand this reaction to LEOBORs. Abolishing
LEOBORs has several intuitively appealing features. Doing so would
restore the procedural balance between police and the rest of us—it
would, in a number of ways, reduce the fairness, legitimacy, and procedural justice problems discussed earlier in this Article by putting police
back on the same formal footing as all interrogees.216 And it might make
the police more accountable and even more likely to inculpate themselves, at least on the margins. But as discussed above, the police will still
have the informal advantages they receive simply from their roles as
insiders in the criminal justice system.217 They will still be the most
sophisticated suspects—the least likely to waive Miranda, to speak to
investigators without an attorney, or to sit in jail pretrial. And they will
still receive informal advantages from their prosecutorial counterparts.218
Those advocating the wholesale abolition of LEOBORs also miss a
rare opportunity to look at how those who conduct interrogations understand these proceedings. Scholars have argued for years that neither
Miranda nor the voluntary-confession cases adequately protect suspects’
rights.219 Yet one weakness in these scholars’ writing is that it is mere
a different course. He told the Marshall Project, “I don’t think, actually, that police officers
should not have these rights. I think that everyone should have a bill of rights like this.” Id.
216. Abolishing LEOBORs would still leave the Garrity decision standing. Thus, police
would still have an advantage both in being protected from a choice of being ﬁred or
inculpating themselves and in the use of the immunity for which Garrity and its progeny
have come to stand. While these remain signiﬁcant problems both for fairness and legitimacy, this Article does not address them in detail here. See supra section II.B (discussing
Garrity decision, which protects police from having to decide between incriminating
themselves and losing employment).
217. See supra section II.A (noting advantages police have in asserting their Miranda
rights due to their legal sophistication).
218. See Levine, How We Prosecute, supra note 9, at 759 (arguing prosecutors take
more care and do more investigation before charging police suspects than any other class
of suspects).
219. See, e.g., Steven D. Clymer, Are Police Free to Disregard Miranda?, 112 Yale L.J.
447, 450 (2002) (“If police are willing to suffer the exclusionary consequences, they can
disregard the Miranda rules without violating the Constitution.”); Drizin & Leo, supra note
110, at 914 (discussing how “modern police interrogation is a two-step process of psychological manipulation”); Godsey, supra note 92, at 470 (“While the theoretical ambiguity
inherent in the voluntariness standard leaves police officers with little guidance in the
ﬁeld, in the courtroom this ambiguity most often works in their favor.”); Herman, supra
note 92, at 745 (criticizing involuntary-confession rule for lack of clarity); Susan R. Klein,
No Time for Silence, 81 Tex. L. Rev. 1337, 1338 (2003) (questioning whether right to
silence is meaningful “if peace officers can use harassing and abusive tactics against
suspects so long as the resulting statements are not used in a subsequent criminal trial”);
Primus, supra note 77, at 2 (“Constitutional regulation of police interrogation is in a state
of collapse.”); Schulhofer, Reconsidering, supra note 79, at 454 (“The notion that policeinitiated warnings can ‘dispel’ the compulsion thus seems dubious at best.”); George C.
Thomas III, Separated at Birth but Siblings Nonetheless: Miranda and the Due Process
Notice Cases, 99 Mich. L. Rev. 1081, 1082 (2001) (“[T]he Miranda version of the Fifth
Amendment permits waiver to be made carelessly, inattentively, and without counsel.”);
Weisselberg, supra note 77, at 1531–90 (challenging assumptions underlying justiﬁcation
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supposition—they are guessing about what interrogation tactics are too
unjust or too unfair and are relying on studies about what leads an
innocent suspect to confess or what makes an incriminating statement
involuntary.220 Indeed, most people have never been inside an interrogation room or performed an interrogation.221 But this is why
LEOBORs are such powerful tools. LEOBORs document the protections
desired by those who know how interrogations are conducted. Thus, they
are an insiders’ guide to protecting suspects from the most coercive
police tactics. The only problem is they currently protect only the least
vulnerable suspects.222
LEOBORs are a script for reform, drafted by the system actors who
do the interrogating.223 But LEOBORs represent more than just the
preferences of interrogators. They also represent the preferences of
those who imagined themselves as the subject of interrogation.224 This
goes some way toward ameliorating another problem that infects the
process of making criminal law and procedure. The legislators tasked
with making law and the courts tasked with interpreting constitutional or
statutory rights are populated largely by those who are not personally
affected by the criminal justice system.225 And while the media and
lobbyists for law enforcement and victims’ groups constantly remind us
to put ourselves in the shoes of the police,226 or in the shoes of potential
of Miranda warning and waiver regime); White, Involuntary Confession, supra note 94, at
2042 (noting “standard interrogation methods precipitate a signiﬁcant number of false
confessions”).
220. See Ronald J. Allen, Theorizing About Self-Incrimination, 30 Cardozo L. Rev.
729, 729 (2008) (“[T]heorizing about self-incrimination in general had been strikingly
unhelpful, because the domain of the Self-Incrimination Clause is too unruly to be
captured by what passes for theory within the legal realm.”). Critiquing the Supreme
Court’s jurisprudence on self-incrimination, William Rehnquist wrote a memo when he
was a law clerk to Justice Jackson on an involuntary-confession case claiming that “[t]he
ivory towers of jurisprudence . . . [have] weakened local law enforcement . . . . Let’s hope
it has come to an end.” See Karina Pergament, Comment, Arizona v. Fulminante:
Romancing Coerced Confessions, 69 Denv. U. L. Rev. 153, 170 (1992) (quoting Rehnquist
memo to Justice Jackson).
221. See Richard A. Leo, Police Interrogation and American Justice 197 (2008)
[hereinafter Leo, Interrogation and Justice] (“Most people . . . have not experienced
[interrogation] ﬁrsthand and do not know anyone who has.”).
222. See supra section II.A (noting advantages police have when under arrest due to
their sophistication and knowledge of justice system).
223. Cf. Leo, Interrogation and Justice, supra note 221, at 197 (“Most people . . . [are]
not familiar with how police are trained to interrogate suspects or with studies that
describe actual interrogation practices.”).
224. See supra section II.B (detailing development of additional protections for
police).
225. See Stuntz, Collapse, supra note 11, at 7 (arguing criminal law has become
harsher as those who suffer its burdens have become less involved in its processes).
226. See Stuntz, Pathological Politics, supra note 42, at 534 (“[L]egislators have good
reason to listen when prosecutors [and police] urge some statutory change. This point is
worth emphasizing, for it may be the single most important feature of the existing system
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victims,227 there is no such policy- or lawmaking presence on behalf of
potential suspects.228
LEOBORs represent rights lobbied for, or negotiated by, police who
ex ante imagine themselves in exactly the position that is so often underor unrepresented in other political contexts. Thus, these statutes and
agreements are valuable tools in two key respects. They are the rights
that the interrogators want for themselves, opening a window for the rest
of us into what tactics those who operate within the world of criminal
justice consider potentially abusive. They are also the rights of those who
have imagined themselves as criminal suspects before knowing whether
or not they will become such suspects. It is rare to ﬁnd such a
combination of knowledge from experts.229 We should make use of this
knowledge rather than hastily disregard it.
Of course, just because police know what tactics are likely to lead to
confession and what tactics they do not want used against themselves
does not mean that LEOBORs represent an optimal or even a good set of
rights for criminal suspects. A skeptic might well say that these rights
were hammered out the way any good negotiation is, and thus, they
represent the best protections that a politically inﬂuential group could
get for its members rather than the protections that should apply to all
criminal suspects.230 Yet some LEOBOR provisions also dovetail with
protections that have independent value, whether because they represent
what social science and studies of exonerated innocents tell us about
for deﬁning criminal law.”); Samuel R. Wiseman, Pretrial Detention and the Right to Be
Monitored, 123 Yale L.J. 1344, 1397 (2014) (“[T]he existence of a potent law enforcement
lobby may lead legislatures to systematically undervalue defendants’ rights . . . .”); see also
Eric Blumenson & Eva Nilsen, Policing for Proﬁt: The Drug War’s Hidden Economic
Agenda, 65 U. Chi. L. Rev. 35, 81, 108–11 (1998) (noting law enforcement “lobby [was]
able to soundly defeat the few congressional efforts to divert some drug law enforcement
funding to other uses”); Michael M. O’Hear, Federalism and Drug Control, 57 Vand. L.
Rev. 783, 818 (2004) (noting “law enforcement has proven to be a potent lobbying force
in resisting changes to drug laws”).
227. See, e.g., Aya Gruber, Rape, Feminism, and the War on Crime, 84 Wash. L. Rev.
581, 622 (2009) (“[T]he victims’ rights movement [is] a powerful lobby with a critical
voice in the justice system.”).
228. See Dennis E. Curtis & Judith Resnik, Grieving Criminal Defense Lawyers, 70
Fordham L. Rev. 1615, 1618 (2002) (noting criminal defendants lack powerful political
organization); Keith Swisher, Pro-Prosecution Judges: “Tough on Crime,” Soft on Strategy,
Ripe for Disqualiﬁcation, 52 Ariz. L. Rev. 317, 387 (2010) (same).
229. See generally Bibas, Machinery, supra note 11, at 34 (noting those who lack
experience with criminal justice system do not get to see how it functions).
230. LEOBORs may be the handiwork of powerful union negotiators who are able to
insist on rights that are more protective than we as a society might choose for interrogation suspects. Even where LEOBORs are statutes, with legislative history, such history
may be affected by the relative weight that union lobbyists have over legislators. For a
particularly strong take on this matter, see Kenneth W. Starr, Observations About the Use
of Legislative History, 1987 Duke L.J. 371, 377 (“[L]obbyists and attorneys have created a
virtual cottage industry in fashioning legislative history so that the Congress will appear to
embrace their particular view in a given statute.”).
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police tactics that may lead to false confessions, because they represent a
ﬂoor of respect that we should seek for criminal suspects, or both.231 In
each case, “appearance of justice” principles and procedural justice concerns bolster the extension of certain LEOBOR provisions to all criminal
suspects.232
B.

Which Protections to Extend to All Suspects

Not all LEOBOR protections should be extended to all suspects. Nor
is a protection’s appearance in a LEOBOR a justiﬁcation, in and of itself,
for such extension, no matter how sensible such a position might
appear.233 To be sufficient, LEOBOR provisions should also have an independent value. Here, this Article makes an initial attempt at suggesting
which provisions in LEOBORs should be extended.234
There are two, often interrelated, values that make a provision
worthy of extension to all suspects. The ﬁrst is what I call “accuracy”
protecting provisions, and the second is what I call a “ﬂoor” for maintaining the legitimacy of the criminal-interrogation process in the sense
that it provides a standard of treatment below which we should not allow
state officials to fall in their pursuit of criminal confessions. The values
that animate Part III of this Article—that we should seek a justice system
that appears just, that maintains legitimacy in the eyes of the public, and
that encourages citizens to obey the law—also favor adopting LEOBOR
provisions that call for humane treatment of suspects.235
1. Accuracy Protections. — Studies of false confessions give us a good,
though incomplete, sense of which police tactics LEOBORs disallow
among those that may coerce an innocent person to make an inculpatory
statement.236 For purposes of this Article, the relevant tactics are (a)
lengthy interrogation237 and (b) false promises of leniency or threats of
231. See infra section IV.B (suggesting which LEOBOR protections should apply to all
suspects).
232. See supra Part III (describing issues created by additional interrogation
protections for police); see also infra section IV.B (suggesting some LEOBOR protections
should be extended to all suspects).
233. See infra section IV.C (providing suggestions on how LEOBOR protections can
be extended).
234. This section is meant to open a discussion about interrogations, false confessions,
and the treatment of suspects. More study and a more sustained discussion of what
interrogation tactics lead to false confessions and reduced trust in law enforcement would
be an important contribution to the scholarly literature and to advocacy for reform.
235. See supra Part III (outlining pillars of justice system and discussing how LEOBOR
protections can undermine them).
236. Cf. Leo, Interrogation and Justice, supra note 221, at 197 (“There is no single
cause of false confession . . . .”); id. at 198 (noting experiments are rare because ethics
prohibit researchers from subjecting people to types of pressures that usually lead to false
confessions).
237. See Garrett, Substance, supra note 184, at 1063–64 (noting suspect may falsely
confess to bring lengthy interrogation to end).
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harsh treatment. Promises of leniency can range from a statement that a
suspect can “go home” or “see her child” if she makes an inculpatory
statement238 to the more obvious “let’s make a deal” false promise where
an officer falsely tells a suspect that, if she confesses, her charges or
incarceration term will be reduced.239 False threats of harshness toward
the suspect include lies about the nature of the charges against her and
the resulting harm that will befall her should she refuse to inculpate
herself.240
a. Length of Interrogation. — In Ashcraft v. Tennessee, the Supreme
Court held that interrogating a suspect for thirty-six hours was unconstitutional because it was “inherently coercive.”241 Since then, social science
and studies of exonerated false confessors have made clear that a person
can be coerced to confess in far less time. Scholars have found that interrogations that last more than a few hours are far more likely to produce
false confessions.242 Professors Drizin and Richard Leo found that of all
the exonerated false confessors where “length of interrogation . . . could
be determined[,] . . . [m]ore than 80% of false confessors were
interrogated for more than six hours and 50% . . . for more than twelve
hours.” As they conclude, “[t]hese numbers are staggering.”243
The impact that interrogation length has on overbearing the will of
an innocent suspect is particularly stark when one considers the average
police interrogation length: less than two hours.244 Based on these numbers, among other things, Professor Eve Brensike Primus has suggested a
constitutional maximum of ﬁve hours—in other words, any interrogation
lasting longer violates the voluntariness test and is inadmissible per se.245
States considering statutory protections for suspects or judges dealing
with the voluntariness test as it currently stands should consider setting a
238. See Leo, Interrogation and Justice, supra note 221, at 199 (noting studies have
shown “promises of leniency” contribute to false confessions).
239. Of course, true promises may also lead to confessions, but because lies are a
factor in LEOBORs while true promises are not and because a true promise of leniency
might lead to a rational choice on the part of the suspect, this Article will only address
such tactics when they are false.
240. See Leo, Interrogation and Justice, supra note 221, at 199 (noting “threats of
harsher punishment” lead to false confessions).
241. 322 U.S. 143, 154 (1944).
242. See Leo, Interrogations and Justice, supra note 221, at 208 (describing how long
interrogations can weaken innocent suspect’s will); Drizin & Leo, supra note 110, at 948
(ﬁnding median length of twelve hours for interrogations eliciting false confessions);
Kassin, Inside Interrogation, supra note 81, at 534 (noting interrogations of false confessors often last much longer than average interrogation).
243. Drizin & Leo, supra note 110, at 948.
244. See Kassin, Inside Interrogation, supra note 81, at 534 (“The average police
interrogation lasts thirty minutes to an hour; the vast majority . . . are completed within
two hours.”).
245. See Primus, supra note 77, at 37 (noting “[m]ost scholars who have looked at this
problem have suggested that continuous questioning be limited to between four and six
hours” and suggesting ﬁve hours as constitutional maximum).
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maximum length of even less time. One way to help determine an appropriate maximum length of an interrogation is to determine for how long
police suspects are interrogated.246 Setting a time limit on interrogations
is likely to reduce false confessions without greatly undermining officers’
ability to get true confessions. As such, it is a provision of LEOBORs that
should be extended to all suspects.
b. Inducement Through Promises of Leniency or Threats of Harshness. — A
number of LEOBOR provisions prevent interrogators from inducing law
enforcement suspects to confess through promises of leniency or
through threats.247 There is good reason to consider extending such
rules to interrogations of all suspects. The false-confession literature is
rife with examples of suspects, usually young or mentally incapacitated,
who report that they confessed so that they could go home to their
mothers or other family members.248 For example, the Central Park Five,
teenagers who falsely confessed and spent years in prison for an
infamous sexual assault in New York City, were told they could go home if
they admitted to the crime.249 In another case, a teenager was told he
could go home if he confessed to a murder he did not commit. After
confessing, the police told him they were sending him home; instead,
they sent him to jail.250
Similarly, threats of harsh treatment are among the tactics police use
that reportedly contribute to false inculpatory statements.251 Such threats
are often in the form of a legal response to refusal to inculpate, such as

246. Information about this, like so much about the criminal justice system, is reliant
on the will of prosecutors and police to be transparent.
247. See supra notes 150, 152 and accompanying text (discussing prohibitions against
promising leniency and threats of punishment).
248. See, e.g., Drizin & Leo, supra note 110, at 982–83 (describing police acquisition
of false confession of three black teenagers, with one confessor claiming he confessed
because he "believe[d] he would be allowed to go home if he signed the statement").
249. See, e.g., Evan Nesterak, Coerced to Confess: The Psychology of False
Confessions, Psych Rep. (Oct. 21, 2014), http://thepsychreport.com/conversations/coercedto-confess-the-psychology-of-false-confessions [http://perma.cc/M8TV-QJ6C] (describing
teenagers who confessed after being held for almost two days and told they could go home
if they confessed).
250. Leo, Interrogations and Justice, supra note 221, at 209.
251. See id. at 201–02 (noting innocent suspects confess “to avoid an anticipated
harsh punishment” and because “negative incentives . . . convince the suspect that it is
futile to deny the crime”); cf. Primus, supra note 77, at 37–38 (listing police interrogative
tactics courts should ﬁnd impermissible, such as “charging a person with a more serious
crime, subjecting him to a greater punishment, punishing his friends or family, administering or withholding medical treatment, taking his children away, or causing him to lose
his livelihood” (footnotes omitted)).
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heightened charges,252 a very long prison term,253 or even the death
penalty,254 or in the form of suggesting potential consequences of not
confessing, such as prison and rape or physical abuse by other inmates.255
To the extent that such a proposal may strike some as too broad, this
Article suggests a middle ground. One way to cabin the use of inducements and threats but not remove them from an officer’s arsenal entirely
would be to have a rule prohibiting false inducements and false threats. In
other words, a police officer would not be allowed to tell a suspect,
falsely, that he could go home to his mother upon confessing to a crime.
But a police officer could tell a suspect that a confession would take the
death penalty off the table, as long as a prosecutor had blessed such an
inducement. Similarly, an officer could not threaten a suspect with the
death penalty if she were accused of a crime that could not theoretically
carry such a punishment, but the officer could use such a threat if capital
charges could be levied.
The beneﬁt of true inducements or explanations of punishment is
that a suspect gets real information with which to make a decision while
the police can still use such tactics to the extent they are useful. On the
other hand, interrogation is already such a coercive situation that such
information might be too hard to process to guarantee that a suspect was
actually making a rational decision to confess.256 Another problem with
this suggestion is that a rule prohibiting false inducements and false
threats would be far harder for a reviewing judge to sort out than a
bright-line rule rejecting the use of inducements or threats per se.
It is hard to know whether shortening confession lengths and
reducing the types of inducements and threats law enforcement can use
will impact the disturbing number of false confessions that have arisen in
the past few decades.257 But these three tactics are ones that the police
252. See Leo, Interrogations and Justice, supra note 221, at 209 (describing situation
in which police “threatened [suspect] with harsher treatment and extreme punishment if
he did not confess”).
253. See Welsh S. White, Miranda’s Failure to Restrain Pernicious Interrogation
Practices, 99 Mich. L. Rev. 1211, 1235 (2001) (“[E]mpirical data support the conclusion
that threats of punishment . . . sometimes produce false confessions.”).
254. See Leo & Ofshe, supra note 181, at 478–79 (summarizing study in which twelve
percent of people confessed after threatened with harsher punishment—“typically the
death penalty”).
255. See Richard A. Leo, False Confessions: Causes, Consequences, and Implications,
37 J. Am. Acad. Psychiatry & L. 332, 335 (2009) (noting some innocent suspects “comply
because they are led to believe that it is the only way to avoid a feared outcome (e.g.,
homosexual rape in prison)”); see also Leo, Interrogations and Justice, supra note 221, at
205 (describing suspect was told if he did not confess he would go to jail where he would
“not survive”).
256. See infra section IV.C (describing limits to beneﬁts of extending LEOBOR
protections for mitigating coercion).
257. See Garrett, Contaminated Confessions, supra note 171, at 427 (noting lack of
adequate empirical data on false confessions, in part because “[r]esearchers cannot
ethically test coercive interrogation techniques in a laboratory setting, and in actual cases
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believe should not be used against their colleagues when they become
suspects and have been identiﬁed as contributing to false confessions in
numerous cases. Restricting law enforcement’s use of long interrogations, inducements, and threats could be a very good starting point to
reforming confession law.
2. Floor Protections. — LEOBORs provide that a suspected officer
must be allowed to attend to her “basic necessities,” which this Article
deﬁnes as regular meals, sleep, and access to the bathroom.258 Such
allowances are largely unaddressed in the false-confession literature.259
This is perhaps because most police detectives already provide such
allowances to suspects.260 Discussion of these deprivations may also be
excluded from the false-confession literature because, unless denied in
the extreme, they are not likely to contribute to an innocent person
inculpating herself. But they are important enough that the police
sought to have them enshrined in formal law or negotiated contract.
Such inclusion in LEOBORs warrants at least an inference that police
feared denial of basic humane treatment when imagining themselves as
suspects.
The values that animate an insistence on ensuring that suspects
receive basic humane treatment are the same values that led to the
abolition of physical abuse and deprivation as a tactic for eliciting
confessions.261 From those cases, it is clear that a ﬂoor does exist in terms
of what police may do to get a suspect to confess.262 As the Court stated in
there often may not be evidence like DNA that can conﬁrm whether the confession is true
or false”).
258. This further deﬁnition is a bit of poetic license as LEOBORs are not entirely clear
as to what physical necessities are, other than “rest periods.” See supra note 148
(addressing LEOBOR inclusion of “physical necessity” provisions).
259. The Supreme Court has nodded to one factor that may be considered in a
voluntariness test: “the use of physical punishment such as the deprivation of food or
sleep.” Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226 (1973).
260. But see Aaron Miguel Cantú, Detroit’s Hidden Crack Casualties, Intercept (Oct.
14, 2015, 9:38 AM), http://theintercept.com/2015/10/14/detroits-hidden-crack-casual
ties-2/ [http://perma.cc/ACA5-WP9G] (describing witness who was locked in dark room
and forced to sit in her own urination because police did not believe her account that her
friends had not committed murder).
261. See Davis v. North Carolina, 384 U.S. 737, 738 (1966) (holding conﬁning suspect
for sixteen days without any communication before interrogation renders confession
inadmissible); Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 154 (1944) (ﬁnding nonstop
interrogation for thirty-six hours is “inherently coercive”); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S.
278, 286 (1936) (ﬁnding physical abuse unconstitutional).
262. See, e.g., Brown, 297 U.S. at 286 (ﬁnding physical torture of suspect rendered
confession inadmissible because treatment by law enforcement was “revolting to [our]
sense of justice” regardless of whether confession might have been voluntary or reliable);
see also Primus, supra note 77, at 25 (noting some Supreme Court and lower-court cases
have suppressed confessions based solely on nature of law enforcement’s behavior). The
literature on humane treatment of suspected terrorists and convicted murderers
sentenced to death may also lend relevance and legitimacy to a proposal that would
require police to treat suspects under interrogation with a certain amount of respect. In
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Brown v. Mississippi, physically abusing a suspect is “revolting to the sense
of justice,” regardless of whether it produces confessions.263 At some
point, physical deprivation also reaches that ﬂoor of revulsion, according
to the Court.264
It would be easy to argue that the indignities included in the
“physical necessity” provisions of LEOBORs are of completely different
scale. But if these indignities are so minor, then their corresponding
utility is also likely to be minimal.265 In other words, why bother letting
police use hunger, minor sleep deprivation, or the use of the bathroom
as a tool for confession when it tells an ugly story about the way law
enforcement treats people without much possible beneﬁt to society? And
if most police do not treat suspects with this kind of disdain, disallowing
it will have little impact on most officers except for a potentially positive
impact on the way suspects view law enforcement.266
In short, ensuring humane treatment of suspects through rules is a
worthy goal. The human and legitimacy costs to our system of having
inhumane treatment serve as a possible tool of interrogators outweigh
whatever marginal beneﬁt inures to investigators by treating suspects
inhumanely in these ways. The next section will address some ways these
reforms could be implemented.

the case of torturing suspected terrorists, the treatment discussed is far more violent, but
the stakes are also far higher—untold potential lives saved. See, e.g., Jeremy Waldron,
Torture and Positive Law: Jurisprudence for the White House, 105 Colum. L. Rev. 1681,
1714 (2005) (arguing against use of torture even in “‘ticking bomb’ case . . . where we are
sure that the detainee we are proposing to torture has information that will save thousands
of lives and will give it up only if subjected to excruciating pain”). In the case of the death
penalty, we require that the condemned not suffer too extremely, despite already having
determined that her life is not worth sparing. While the Supreme Court has “never
invalidated a State’s chosen procedure for carrying out a sentence of death as the inﬂiction of cruel and unusual punishment,” Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 48 (2008), it has
observed that “‘[p]unishments are cruel when they involve torture or a lingering death.’”
Id. at 49 (quoting In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 447 (1890)). Moreover, in dissent Justice
Ginsburg noted, “[i]t is undisputed that the second and third drugs used in Kentucky’s
three-drug lethal injection protocol, pancuronium bromide and potassium chloride,
would cause a conscious inmate to suffer excruciating pain” and that, without a third drug
allegedly rendering the condemned unconscious, such treatment would be considered
cruel and unusual. Id. at 113–14 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
263. 297 U.S. at 286.
264. See Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 226 (considering “physical punishment such as the
deprivation of food or sleep” as relevant factor in determining whether “defendant’s will
was overborne”).
265. Cf. Criminal Interrogation and Confessions 190 (Fred E. Inabu, John E. Reid, et
al. eds., 2013) (providing example of widely used interrogation training manual making
no mention of food, sleep, or meals as interrogation tools).
266. See supra section III.B (discussing how image of law enforcement’s motivations
affects citizens’ impressions of value of criminal law); see also infra note 305 (highlighting
polls showing citizen distrust of law enforcement).
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How to Extend These Protections and Some Potential Results

This section looks at two ways to extend LEOBOR protections. First,
they could be extended through legislative action; second, they could be
used as a tool for judges who must apply the totality of the circumstances
test.267 This section then considers the positive systemic implications of
extending affirmative interrogation rights to all suspects and then considers some possible negative ones.
1. Legislative Action. — Statutory change in favor of criminal suspects
and defendants has been very difficult, if not impossible, to implement in
the recent past. It has been considered political suicide for a legislator to
support this least-favored minority, particularly given the political
strength of law enforcement and victims’-rights lobbies.268 But the culture
has changed dramatically in the past few years in two ways: First,
awareness of our broken and overburdened criminal justice system has
made reforming it a political issue on a national and state level. The
Supreme Court has ordered California to reduce its overcrowded prison
population.269 Proposals to lower sentences, remove harsh three-strike
laws, and decriminalize low-level possession of narcotics abound.270
Second, the increased attention to police brutality has made this once
politically untouchable group more open to questions from citizens and
politicians. In New York, the governor has removed all police-killing
prosecutions from the hands of local district attorneys, citing their
inherent conﬂict of interest when tasked with prosecuting their law
enforcement allies.271 California has passed a statute to remove the
267. One solution this Article does not propose is change at the federal constitutional
level. The Supreme Court has made clear through its decisions that it is not interested in
proscribing law enforcement tactics. See, e.g., Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428,
428 (reaffirming Miranda as standard for confession law). Change at the state- and lowercourt level could happen more swiftly and perhaps could make the best sense, as these are
the places where most criminal procedure is actually implemented.
268. See Gruber, supra note 227, at 622 (noting elected officials “have constructed the
criminal as an inhuman bogeyman,” propelling “importance of the innocent victim”); see
also supra note 228 (acknowledging weakness of criminal defendants’ lobby).
269. Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1947 (2011) (discussing manner in which state
may implement three-judge court’s order to reduce prison population).
270. In 2014, Congress approved amendments to reduce sentences for drug-trafficking
crimes. Sentencing Guidelines for United States Courts, 79 Fed. Reg. 3280 (Jan. 17, 2014).
In 2012, California voted to reform its three-strikes law in a referendum. See Jane
Susskind, Changes in Three Strikes Law Reform California’s Prison System, IVN (Nov. 9,
2012), http://ivn.us/2012/11/09/changes-in-three-strikes-law-reform-california-prison-system
[http://perma.cc/9NQD-LZKD]. Numerous states have decriminalized certain marijuanapossession offenses. See State Laws with Alternatives to Incarceration for Marijuana
Possession, MPP.org, http://www.mpp.org/issues/decriminalization/state-laws-with-alternativesto-incarceration-for-marijuana-possession [http://perma.cc/8S2U-4Z6Y] (listing states,
such as Delaware, that have decriminalized marijuana possession).
271. See Exec. Order No. 147, A Special Prosecutor to Investigate and Prosecute
Matters Relating to the Deaths of Civilians Caused by Law Enforcement Officers, 37 N.Y.
Reg. 73 (July 8, 2015) (requiring Attorney General “to investigate, and if warranted,
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option of “secret” grand jury hearings for police suspects.272 Thus, the
political stage is set for even greater reform. With LEOBORs gaining
national attention, interrogation reform seems more possible than ever
before.
A state legislature that wished to protect accused citizens from
certain interrogation tactics could use LEOBORs both as a model and as
a justiﬁcation for reform. Such a statute could apply at any stage of an
investigation. It would not have to be contingent on a formal arrest,273
but assuming states would not make such a dramatic change to pre-arrest
law enforcement tactics,274 a politically feasible statute would likely apply
after formal arrest. Such a statute could look something like this:
A suspect who has been formally arrested and has waived her
Miranda rights is entitled to the following protections during
any interrogation that follows:
a. A suspect has a right to know about any and all charges
being considered against her that are known to the
police.
b. Each interrogation session may not last more than three
hours, and a suspect must be given a reasonable amount
of time to rest between sessions.
c. Food, water, and other basic necessities must be provided at normal mealtimes.
d. Bathroom breaks must be offered at reasonable intervals
or provided upon request.
e. No untrue threats or promises may be made in order to
induce a statement, including but not limited to:
i. Threats of physical harm.
ii. Threats the suspect will lose her employment by
missing work.
iii. Threats that her partner/spouse or children will
be harmed by her refusal to speak.
iv. Promises of leniency in return for a statement.
v. Promises that a suspect will be able to leave the
precinct if she makes a statement.

prosecute certain matters involving the death of an unarmed civilian, whether in custody
or not, caused by a law enforcement officer”); see also Levine, Who Shouldn’t Prosecute,
supra note 3 (manuscript at 47) (discussing Governor Andrew Cuomo’s executive order).
272. See Melanie Mason, Gov. Brown Signs Law Barring Grand Juries in Police Deadly
Force Cases, L.A. Times (Aug. 11, 2015, 2:36 PM), http://www.latimes.com/local/
political/la-me-pc-brown-grand-juries-20150811-story.html [http://perma.cc/FL2V-DA6V]
(reporting passage of law banning secret grand juries in cases involving “excessive or
deadly force by law enforcement”).
273. LEOBORs apply as soon as an officer is investigated for any infraction. See supra
section II.B (discussing mechanics of LEOBORs and other protections for police
suspects).
274. See generally, Maoz, supra note 80, at 1320–22 (discussing pre-arrest coercive
tactics that manipulate Miranda restraints).
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Nothing in this statute should prevent a law enforcement officer from refraining from any tactic that she
would not want used against her should she be the suspect of a police investigation.
For the most part, this proposed statute is taken directly from
LEOBORs. The last section would be included in order to remind an
officer that she should treat the subject of a criminal investigation in the
manner that she would want to be treated. Any state legislature that has a
LEOBOR should be encouraged to pass a statute like the one proposed
above. At the very least, it should be asked to explain why such a statute
exists for police but should not be extended to all suspects. This should
be a hard question for a legislature to answer coherently.275
2. Make Reviewing Judges Aware of LEOBORs. — If legislators would
not or could not pass a statute like the one suggested above, LEOBORs
could still provide judges with powerful tools for assessing whether a
confession is voluntary under a totality of the circumstances test. This is
true even assuming the constitutional framework does not change.276
As discussed in Part II, the current state of suppression hearings
leaves the decision of whether a suspect’s confession was voluntary
entirely to the discretion of, and on the shoulders of, reviewing judges.
These judges face many systemic and professional obstacles when asked
to suppress a confession. First, because a confession is such powerful
evidence, in many cases it may represent the only evidence the state has
to convict a defendant. Thus, a judge who would suppress a confession is
essentially tanking the prosecutor’s case and freeing a potentially
dangerous suspect, a point no prosecutor will let her forget. Judges have
numerous reasons to avoid doing this. First, they may have a natural bias
in favor of the professional repeat players who come into their courtrooms.277 They have the confession itself, which once made, is subject to
conﬁrmation bias.278 Even if a judge is able to rise above these powerful
275. See supra section III.B (explaining why there is no coherent reason for police to
have extra criminal procedure advantages).
276. See supra section II.A (noting totality of circumstances test leaves consideration
of factors to individual judges).
277. See Levine, Who Shouldn’t Prosecute, supra note 3 (manuscript at 14–18)
(describing explicit and implicit biases in courtroom actors); see also Anthony G.
Amsterdam, The Supreme Court and the Rights of Suspects in Criminal Cases, 45 N.Y.U.
L. Rev. 785, 792 (1970) (noting fact-ﬁnders generally ﬁnd police testimony credible);
Steven W. Becker, When Judges Judge Themselves: The Chicago Police Torture Scandal
and the Continuing Quest for Justice in the Case of People v. Keith Walker, 3 DePaul J. Soc.
Just. 115, 137 (2010) (discussing “marked pro-law-enforcement bias and its fraternity of
former prosecutors [among] the Cook County judiciary”); cf. Charlie Sarosy, Comment,
Parole Denial Habeas Corpus Petitions: Why the California Supreme Court Needs to
Provide More Clarity on the Scope of Judicial Review, 61 UCLA L. Rev. 1134, 1178 (2014)
(noting law enforcement bias during parole hearings).
278. See Garrett, Contaminated Confessions, supra note 171, at 396 (“The outsized
weight placed on confession evidence may explain why recent DNA exonerations are so
dominated by false confessions. Judges, defense lawyers, prosecutors, and jurors may have
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pressures, she then must insert herself into the mind of the suspect—how
vulnerable is she? How calculating?279 How do youth, intelligence, or
mental stability affect her ability to consent? And she must question
police tactics based primarily on officers’ testimony about what happened. Naturally, the police will remember their actions in the most
positive light. Judges may tend to credit professional law enforcement’s
account of an event over that of a criminal defendant who has confessed
to a crime and is facing imprisonment.280
A checklist of interrogation techniques that are prohibited against
police suspects, even if not made mandatory in confession law, would
immediately do a number of things for a reviewing judge. First, it would
give the judge a structure through which she could consider the testimony she hears at a suppression proceeding. Second, the knowledge that
this checklist is modeled on LEOBORs could do several things to upend
the natural biases she faces: It would remind her that law enforcement
officers are not always interrogators—sometimes they too are suspects. It
would show her what these knowledgeable criminal justice insiders would
consider unfair tactics should they be facing questioning. And it would
give her demonstrable reasons to question the credibility of officers who
claimed that their tactics did not impact the suspect.281
Similarly, at the appellate level, where the likelihood that a
conviction will be overturned due to an involuntary concession is even
more remote, LEOBORs could be useful tools. Appellate judges should
be made aware of these special provisions for police. Despite the
temporal disadvantage a suspect faces on appeal from a conviction,
appellate judges are insulated from many of the institutional problems
that trial judges face. Their credibility judgments are based on a
transcript, not live witnesses. They do not have the same daily interaction
with prosecutors and police. Thus, they might well be more able to see
the objective unfairness of tactics used by police—tactics that LEOBORs
prevent from being used against the police.
3. Possible Results. — The systemic beneﬁts to extending affirmative
protections to all suspects are numerous and exciting. In short, such an
extension presents the possibility of correcting the current state of
a very hard time believing that a person could confess falsely.”); Saul M. Kassin, Why
Confessions Trump Innocence, 67 Am. Psychologist 431, 441 (2012) (“[F]alse confessions,
once taken, arouse a strong inference of guilt, thereby unleashing a chain of conﬁrmation
biases that make the consequences difficult to overcome despite innocence.”).
279. See supra section II.A (discussing how legal standards for confessions privilege
sophisticated defendants).
280. See supra note 277 (discussing implicit biases that may beneﬁt repeat players like
law enforcement).
281. A defense attorney with a willing judge could also make powerful use of
LEOBORs. She could compare each tactic used against her client to what would happen if
an officer suspect were being questioned. She could also capitalize on the fact that her
client, in most cases, would be signiﬁcantly less knowledgeable and sophisticated than the
officers protected by this extra due process.
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inversion that exists between the most sophisticated suspects and the
protection from coercive tactics that they receive.282 Righting this
inversion presents the possible beneﬁts of ensuring we treat all suspects
with some level of dignity, shoring up the legitimacy of the criminal
justice system,283 suggesting that system actors care about fairness for all
suspects, and increasing trust in the law.284
It is impossible to calculate how many innocent suspects might not
confess if they had extra affirmative rights,285 but it is clear that false
confessions are a serious problem.286 If research on what compels a
vulnerable suspect to confess is correct, changes in police practices could
at least reduce the number of innocents who falsely confess.287 For example, a number of the exonorees in Professor Garrett’s studies confessed
after twelve-hour interrogation sessions. If a time limit were statutorily
imposed, such a long interrogation would not have transpired. These
practical standards that LEOBORs provide could save innocent suspects
the torture of a false conviction and imprisonment. States, in avoiding
false convictions, would also save millions of dollars in incarceration costs
and the cost of lawsuits that ﬂow from the exoneration of the innocent.288
Similarly, more humane interrogation practices would reduce the
likelihood that a confession results from a suspect’s vulnerability rather
than a true desire to confess or a sophisticated knowledge of the beneﬁts
of early confession.289 This could have an impact beyond individual
suspects. As many of the most vulnerable suspects are less educated, less
wealthy, and less intelligent, their high rate of incarceration is an offense
to our notions of justice. Figuring out ways to ensure that justice is meted
out as fairly as possible is one of the main aspirations of criminal proce-

282. See supra Part III (describing origins and mechanics of this paradox).
283. See supra section III.A (describing legitimacy deﬁcits in current system).
284. See supra section III.B (arguing special procedures for police may increase
distrust of system and scorn for the law).
285. See Leo & Ofshe, supra note 181, at 431 (“[N]o one knows precisely how often
false confessions occur in the United States, how frequently false confessions lead to
wrongful convictions, or how much personal and social harm false confessions cause.”).
286. See Garrett, Contaminated Confessions, supra note 171, at 396 (reviewing recent
exonerations and arguing this “second wave of false confessions should cause even greater
alarm than the ﬁrst”).
287. See Drizin & Leo, supra note 110, at 910–11 (“Social scientists and legal scholars
have amply documented that contemporary methods of psychological interrogation can,
and sometimes do, lead innocent individuals to confess falsely to serious felony crimes.”).
288. See, e.g., Lawrence C. Marshall, Gideon’s Paradox, 73 Fordham L. Rev. 955, 967
(2004) (“[T]he State of Illinois has paid . . . ﬁve defendants approximately $600,000
under its compensation statute for the wrongly convicted . . . . [T]he State also incurred
the needless expense [of $1.7 million] of imprisoning these innocent defendants for
seventy-six years collectively.”).
289. See supra section III.A (noting connection between inhumane interrogation
practices and disproportionate number of false confessions from “particularly vulnerable
populations”).
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dural rights.290 Humane interrogation procedures are one way to make a
dent in this daunting project.
Fewer confessions might also encourage better practices by police
and prosecutors generally. As mentioned above, when a confession is
made, often no further investigation follows.291 If fewer confessions were
coerced, police would have to use the many other investigative tools in
their possession to ensure that the correct suspect had been identiﬁed.292
They would have to interview more witnesses, test DNA samples, and use
other scientiﬁc and technological advances to investigate.293 Prosecutors,
who could not rest on the assumption that a questionable confession
would be ruled voluntary, would also be forced to investigate further or
think harder before bringing charges against a suspect.294 While this may
seem like a costly remedy in the short term, avoiding false confessions
and giving more thorough precharge process might well save money over
time.295 Particularly if changes led to fewer false confessions, prosecutors
could also more credibly assert that confessions were voluntary.

290. See supra notes 59–60 and accompanying text (describing how one main purpose
of criminal procedure should be ensuring equal justice).
291. See Leo & Ofshe, supra note 181, at 440–41 (“Once a confession is obtained,
investigation often ceases, and convicting the defendant becomes the only goal of both
investigators and prosecutors.”).
292. See id. (“Sometimes police become so certain of the suspect’s guilt that they
refuse to even-handedly evaluate new evidence or to consider the possibility that a suspect
may be innocent, even when all the case evidence has been gathered and overwhelmingly
demonstrates that the confession is false.”); see also Leo, Interrogation and Justice, supra
note 221, at 206 (describing case in which, after inducing false confession, police
discovered perpetrator of arson but statute of limitations had run).
293. See Keith A. Findley, Judicial Gatekeeping of Suspect Evidence: Due Process and
Evidentiary Rules in the Age of Innocence, 47 Ga. L. Rev. 723, 761 (2013) (“[S]ome
forward-looking law enforcement agencies . . . have already adopted [best] practices
[supported by social science research] as guidelines.”); Katherine R. Kruse, Instituting
Innocence Reform: Wisconsin’s New Governance Experiment, 2006 Wis. L. Rev. 645, 645
(“[G]rowing collection of DNA exonerations has also revealed deeper patterns of
dysfunction in the investigation and prosecution of crimes [including] false confessions . . . .”); cf. Shima Baradaran, Rebalancing the Fourth Amendment, 102 Geo. L.J. 1,
42–43 (2013) (“[M]any police stations in the country have moved to a model of evidencebased policing and track most of their actions—including searches, crimes reported and
apprehended—and other safety risks to the public.”); Matthew J. Parlow, The Great
Recession and Its Implications for Community Policing, 28 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 1193, 1223
(2012) (noting “many local governments have shifted their operational models to include
enhanced technology that allows police departments to improve their outcomes and
increase efficiency”).
294. See Garrett, Judging Innocence, supra note 77, at 122 (noting exonerations have
raised conversation about ways to reform interrogation to improve accuracy).
295. See Levine, How We Prosecute, supra note 9, at 774 (discussing how more
thorough precharge process from prosecutors might actually be economically sound
proposition).
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Ironically, despite likely protestation, limits on interrogation tactics
could actually help the police.296 As it now stands, it is very hard for even
the most scrupulous officer to know how much is too much, how far is
too far, and how vulnerable a given suspect is.297 In Professor Garrett’s
most recent study, a number of suspects were reported to have revealed
information about their alleged crimes that only a suspect or the police
could know.298 Once these people were exonerated, it became apparent
that such “confessions” were clearly contaminated by their interrogators.
Professor Garrett suggests that, rather than a function of intentional
contamination, such details were given to suspects by police “completely
unintentionally” during a “complex” interrogation in which “police offer
suspects a set of complicated and increasingly inculpatory accounts of
the crime in an effort to secure a confession.”299 Bright-line rules
designed to decrease the complexity of interrogations and to disallow
certain techniques would give the police far clearer signals about how to
question a suspect. In short, it would not ask police to be psychologists
on top of investigators.
Insisting on certain affirmative protections for suspects would also
help trial and appellate judges. Rather than having to divine in each case
what mixture of tactics may have overborne a suspect’s will, judges would
have clearer rules from which to work.300 If, for instance, it were
determined that three hours was the upward limit of an interrogation
before it became coercive, judges would be able to rely on a clear rule to
make a determination.301 This would save time and administrative costs
and ensure that judges did not have to insert themselves into the minds
of individual suspects to determine how vulnerable they were.302 It would
also save judges from having to make individualized guesses about a
certain law enforcement officer’s behavior.303 It might also correct for
296. See Godsey, supra note 92, at 469–70 (noting problematic uncertainty for police
caused by fact that “[f]actors that later might become important to the inquiry, such as the
education of the suspect or the suspect’s psychological strengths and weaknesses, are
usually unknown to the officer at the time of the interrogation”).
297. See id. (noting lack of “clear guidelines . . . hinders [officers’] ability to plan and
conduct interrogations in a manner that they can feel conﬁdent will be immune from
criticism later”).
298. See Garrett, Contaminated Confessions, supra note 171, at 408–09 (discussing
how confession contamination may occur intentionally—as when officers “feed facts” to
suspect—or unintentionally—as when officers offer suspects “increasingly inculpatory
accounts of the crime” to secure confession).
299. Id.
300. See supra section II.A (discussing how coercive but legal police tactics lead to
false confessions in disturbing number of cases).
301. See Godsey, supra note 92, at 527 (arguing objective test would be “easier for . . .
judges to apply in a courtroom”).
302. See id. at 469 (describing “task of divining a suspect’s state of mind” as
“Herculean”).
303. See Herman, supra note 92, at 745 (noting judges have to determine whether
police went too far with no objective factors).
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possible law enforcement bias on the part of judges by taking away some
of their discretion in suppression decisionmaking.304
Extending LEOBOR protections to all suspects would have, perhaps,
an even greater impact on ordinary citizens. At this moment, when
citizen distrust of both politicians and law enforcement is at a problematic level,305 a public acknowledgment that LEOBORs should protect
everyone, not only the police, would have an immediate salutary effect. It
would be the embodiment of justice appearing just.306 While repealing
LEOBORs might achieve a similar goal, it would not be as effective.
Extending LEOBORs to all suspects would show that law enforcement
had indeed negotiated sincerely for their protections. It would also show
that those in power, recognizing the unfairness of selectively applying
such protections, had decided to accord ordinary citizens the same
rights.307 Particularly if publicized in conjunction with data about false
confessions, the public would likely respond favorably to common sense
and easily understandable protections—protections that some might well
assume already exist.308 Extending LEOBOR protections to all suspects
would take a dangerously delegitimizing favoritism and turn it into a
legitimizing and politically appealing criminal justice reform.309 Moreover, the costs of doing this, either through legislative or judicial action,

304. See, e.g., David N. Dorfman, Proving the Lie: Litigating Police Credibility, 26 Am.
J. Crim. L. 455, 469 (1999) (noting judges do not scrutinize credibility of police witnesses).
305. See, e.g., Susan Page, Poll: Whites and Blacks Question Police Accountability,
USA Today (Aug. 26, 2014, 4:42 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/
2014/08/25/usa-today-pew-poll-police-tactics-military-equipment/14561633/ [http://perma.
cc/E85P-47RZ] (“Americans by 2-to-1 say police departments nationwide don’t do a good
job in holding officers accountable for misconduct, treating racial groups equally and
using the right amount of force.”); Bill Schneider, Do Americans Trust Their Cops to Be
Fair and Just? New Poll Contains Surprises, Reuters: The Great Debate (Jan. 15, 2015),
http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2015/01/15/one-third-of-americans-believe-policelie-routinely [http://perma.cc/2C23-A683] (“Thirty-one percent of Americans believe
[police lie to serve their own interests], and that number rises to 45 percent among
African-Americans, 41 percent among young people and 39 percent among Democrats.”);
Paul Steinhauser, CNN Poll: Trust in Government at All-time Low, CNN (Aug. 8, 2014, 6:00
AM),
http://politicalticker.blogs.cnn.com/2014/08/08/cnn-poll-trust-in-government-at-alltime-low-2 [http://perma.cc/G4SM-XSNE] (noting “[j]ust 13% of Americans say the
government can be trusted to do what is right always or most of the time”).
306. See supra section III.A (arguing special formal protections for police suspects
raise numerous systemic harms, particularly in combination with other procedural
advantages police receive).
307. See Tyler & Huo, supra note 186, at 14–15 (noting trust increases when
procedures are distributed evenly and authorities are seen as having unbiased motives).
308. Cf. Drizin & Leo, supra note 110, at 910 (“Most people do not appear to know
that interrogation-induced false confessions even exist.”).
309. Cf. supra section III.A (describing dangers of false confessions to legitimacy of
system more generally).
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would be slight—the protections have already been negotiated and
outlined for legislators and judges.310
A concrete and beneﬁcial action of this kind by lawmakers could do
more than just restore the legitimacy of the system in some portion of
society’s eyes.311 If procedural-justice empiricists are correct, it might also
impact the normative value of criminal law and even compliance with the
laws we care to enforce.312 A public that sees law enforcement actors
respecting them, acting to correct corruptive inﬂuences, and doing their
best to distribute criminal procedure evenly should lead to a higher level
of trust from citizens. This higher level of trust should lead, at least in
some portions of society, to greater respect for the law.313
Any amount of fairness, accuracy, and legitimacy that can be injected
into our current system is a project worth seriously considering. The fact
that, in this case, the project emanates from the most knowledgeable
insiders and is relatively inexpensive to impose makes extending
LEOBORs to all a practical and powerful reform. But like any reform
proposal, this suggestion will raise objections.
One counterargument arises immediately: Police, as insiders, are not
designing a fair system, they are designing a corrupt one. They know
what interrogation techniques compel suspects to confess and they want
to protect themselves from such techniques, not to protect innocent
police suspects but to protect guilty ones. In other words, a cynic might
say that LEOBORs are corrupt protection for corrupt insiders,314 in
which case their extension to all suspects will overcorrect, meaning fewer
guilty suspects will confess, making it harder for law enforcement to solve
crimes efficiently.315

310. See supra section II.B (discussing how Supreme Court and state lawmakers have
ensured police suspects beneﬁt from formal protections not extended to most other
suspects).
311. See supra section III.A (discussing “appearance of justice” principle).
312. See supra section III.B (noting public perception that authorities have
“benevolent” motives encourages deference to criminal law).
313. See supra section III.B (arguing in order for criminal law to encourage
compliance for any reason other than fear of punishment, those entrusted to enforce it
must be seen as motivated by unbiased and just purposes).
314. See Butler, supra note 160 (“It is far from a fanciful concern that the police will
take advantage of all the extra due process they get under [LEOBORs] to concoct an
alternative version of events.”); Hager, supra note 5 (discussing Maryland’s LEOBOR
legislation and noting “[a]s many as [eleven] other states are considering similar
legislation, and many of the rest have written essentially the same rights and privileges into
their contracts with the police unions”); Olson, supra note 3 (discussing how some states,
like Maryland, passed LEOBORs “invariably after lobbying from police unions and
associations”).
315. Cf. Bibas, Right to Remain Silent, supra note 105, at 421–22 (arguing Miranda
overcorrects); Cassell, Protecting the Innocent, supra note 92, at 498 (contending
interrogators are already too restricted).
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This Article has already speciﬁcally addressed this issue by suggesting
extension of only those LEOBOR provisions that also have an independent rationale. More broadly, overcorrection is a reasonable concern and
one reason to advocate for repeal of LEOBORs. However, serious
consideration reveals several responses to this position. First, as the
history of LEOBORs shows, the police did not lobby for these statutes in
a cynical manner.316 Their statements reﬂect a real belief that affirmative
interrogation protections were necessary in order to protect officers’
rights not to incriminate themselves. Second, while it is impossible to say
that extending some or all of these affirmative rights to all suspects will
not overcorrect on the margins, it is unlikely to do so for the majority of
suspects. This is for a number of reasons. Suspects who genuinely want to
talk to the police will not be deterred because they are allowed to tend to
basic needs or to sleep or to understand what charges they are facing.317
Police training manuals themselves make clear that, for most suspects, an
hour or two of questioning is enough to produce a voluntary
statement.318 Sophisticated suspects, who are not inclined to talk to the
police, will invoke their Miranda rights and refuse to talk to the police at
all.319 This leaves an admittedly unknowable number of suspects who
have no rational desire to speak to the police. Some number of these
suspects confess, either because they do not understand their rights or
because they are compelled through bullying or other interrogation
techniques.320
This is the current state of interrogation law. Law enforcement and a
few scholars believe this is optimal—for all suspects other than the
police. Most scholars who write on the subject do not. Potential
overcorrection for some guilty suspects who will not speak to the police if
we extend LEOBOR rights to them is possible.321 But it is also certain that
some of these suspects are innocent and others are particularly vul316. See supra section II.B (detailing development of additional protections for police
in interrogations).
317. See Bibas, Right to Remain Silent, supra note 105, at 424–25 (discussing reasons
rational suspect would choose to confess); Stuntz, Mistake, supra note 104, at 977
(“[S]uspects separate themselves, not the police, into two categories: talkative and
quiet.”).
318. Kassin, Inside Interrogation, supra note 81, at 534 (“The average police
interrogation lasts thirty minutes to an hour; the vast majority of interrogations are
completed within two hours. In Criminal Interrogation and Confessions, the authors state that
three or four hours are almost always sufficient.” (citing Fred Inbau et al., Criminal
Interrogation and Confessions 423 (4th ed. 2001))).
319. See Stuntz, Mistake, supra note 104, at 977 (noting sophisticated suspects will not
waive Miranda and will refuse to talk at all).
320. See supra section II.A (noting laws governing interrogation favor sophisticated
suspects).
321. Cf. Bibas, Right to Remain Silent, supra note 105, at 421–22 (arguing Miranda
helps only guilty suspects); Cassell, Protecting the Innocent, supra note 92, at 498 (noting
lost confessions arising from restrictions on interrogation).
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nerable.322 Whether through putting ourselves in their place, taking
lessons from exonerations, or simply caring that constitutional criminal
procedure applies equally, these are the suspects society should seek to
protect the most.323
Another reasonable objection would be the opposite one: Extending
affirmative interrogation rights does not go far enough. For instance,
many criminal justice reformers believe that no suspect should be
allowed to speak to the police without an attorney, period.324 In practice,
however, this means changing Sixth Amendment law to include interrogation as a critical stage at which a suspect must be given an attorney.325 It
also means spending potentially millions of additional dollars for more
public defenders.326 In short, it means reimagining the entire structure of
interrogations.
This Article’s proposal is far more limited and may well not protect
suspects’ rights as much as many would like. But it has the beneﬁt of
feasibility and a more subtle beneﬁt that the police would have to
confront their own desired treatment before interrogating others. The
very explicitness of this comparison might have more impact on the way
police conduct interrogations than we realize. There are surely some
detectives who coerce confessions, knowing full well that they would not
be subject to the tactics they use. My intuition, however, is that most do
not think about it in these terms. If they were made aware that the
protections they now needed to respect were designed by them, it would
necessarily be harder to toss them aside. Affirmative interrogation protections would be as easy to implement as Miranda rights.327 Unlike Miranda,
however, which law enforcement may still see as imposed by judges from

322. See, e.g., Garrett, Contaminated Confessions, supra note 171, at 399–400 (noting
most false confessors in study of exonerees were young, mentally retarded, or mentally ill).
323. See supra section II.A (noting constitutional interrogation law favors certain
suspects); see also supra section III.A (describing issues that providing additional protecttions in certain interrogation settings create).
324. See, e.g., Dearborn, supra note 101, at 363 (arguing one can rely on Sixth
Amendment and “conclude that the right to counsel should attach as soon as practicable
following arrest, but no later than prior to any custodial interrogation”); Daniel C. Nester,
Distinguishing Fifth and Sixth Amendment Rights to Counsel During Police Questioning,
16 S. Ill. U. L.J. 101, 125 (1991) (“[T]he Sixth Amendment should extend to
preindictment situations, [like] custodial interrogation . . . .”).
325. See Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 205 (1964) (ﬁling of formal charges
triggers critical phase in which attorney is required).
326. This is very unlikely to happen, given that public defenders are already
chronically underfunded and overworked. See, e.g., Darryl K. Brown, Rationing Criminal
Defense Entitlements: An Argument from Institutional Design, 104 Colum. L. Rev. 801,
808 (2004) (“[The] underfunding of criminal defense is, in effect, a permanent feature of
American criminal justice.”).
327. See, e.g., Weisselberg, supra note 77, at 1595 (noting police organizations have
come to “love” Miranda).
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on high,328 to ignore the interrogation protections suggested here would
mean that the police were disrespecting rights they themselves had
erected.
CONCLUSION
As a society, we are reckoning with police violence speciﬁcally and
the failures of our criminal justice system more generally as never before.
Police as criminal suspects and defendants raise a host of systemic
legitimacy issues that have heretofore never been examined. Both
through formal rules and informal favoritism, police suspects are granted
advantages that no other suspects receive. These procedural advantages
add to the growing list of ways in which criminal justice in this country is
an unfair and untenable system of law. Police are part of a small cadre of
criminal justice professionals who understand and inﬂuence how the
criminal justice system operates. As such, favoritism toward them
presents important and unexplored mechanisms through which to
suggest and study reform possibilities for entrenched and problematic
areas of the criminal justice process. This Article has addressed how one
such area—confession law—can be reformed. Extending the protections
police suspects receive from interrogation tactics to all criminal
defendants will not solve our criminal justice problems, but it may increase the humanity with which suspects are treated and the accuracy of
their confessions. Moreover, recognizing what we can learn from how
police protect themselves and are protected by other criminal justice
professionals opens up numerous other ways in which we might make
critical changes to our overburdened, inaccurate, racially charged, and
economically unfeasible system.

328. See, e.g., Paul G. Cassell, Miranda’s “Negligible” Effect on Law Enforcement:
Some Skeptical Observations, 20 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 325, 345 (1997) (arguing Miranda
hampers police and stating, “[while] human costs seem unworthy of much attention from
the vantage of the ivory tower . . . Miranda’s countless victims would doubtless tell a
different story”).

